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I. INTRODUCTION
The favorite culprits for high [B]lack prison rates include a biased
legal system, draconian drug enforcement, and even prison itself.
None of these explanations stands up to scrutiny.  The [B]lack incar-
ceration rate is overwhelmingly a function of [B]lack crime. Insisting
otherwise only worsens [B]lack alienation and further defers a real
solution to the [B]lack crime problem.1
The above quotation illustrates the main argument in opposition to the
assertion that racial discrimination exists in the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem.  Supporting this argument are the statistics from the federal Bureau
of Justice Statistics stating that the homicides committed by African-
Americans occurred at a rate of more than seven times that of Cauca-
sians.2  “From 1976 to 2005, [B]lacks committed over [fifty-two] percent
1. Heather Mac Donald, Is the Criminal-Justice System Racist?, CITY J., Spring 2008,
at 12, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2008/18_2_criminal_justice_system.html.  For
an understanding of Black alienation see Mark Satin, John McWhorter’s Perscription for
Black America: Stop “Therapuetic Alienation Now!, RADICAL MIDDLE NEWSLETTER (July
15, 2006),  http://www.radicalmiddle.com/x_mcwhorter.htm (revieiwing John McWhorter’s
book WINNING THE RACE: BEYOND THE CRISIS IN BLACK AMERICA (2005)).
2. Homicide Trends in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/homicide/race.cfm (last revised Oct. 22, 2011) (data concerns homide rates
from 1976–2005); Mac Donald, supra note 1.
For [W]hites, the homicide offending rate began at 4.9 in 1976 and rose to 6.4 in 1980.
The rate then decreased, reaching 3.5 in 2000, before increasing to 3.6 in 2001, where it
remained constant until 2002.  After 2002, it fell to 3.5 in 2003, before increasing to 3.6
in 2004.  Then the rate dropped to 3.5 in 2005.  For [B]lack, the homicide offending
rate began at 46.6 in 1976 and fell to 44.4 in 1977.  The rate then increased, reaching
51.4 in 1980, before decreasing to 33.1 in 1984.  After 1984, it rose to 51.4 in 1991,
before decreasing to a low of 24.1 in 2004.  Then the rate increased to 26.5 in 2005.
For other races, the homicide offending rate began at 4.6 in 1976 and increased to 4.8
in 1977.  Then the rate fell to 3.8 in 1978, before increasing, reaching 7.0 in 1980.  Then
it decreased to 2.7 in 2004, before rising to 2.8 in 2005.
Homicide Trends in the U.S., supra.
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of all murders” that occurred in the United States.3  Furthermore, studies
have shown that across a range of crimes, parity exists between the race
of assailants identified by victims and arrest rates, implying that, barring
any evidence of latent racism in crime victims’ reports, the high arrest
rate of certain races is not biased.4
Countering the argument cited above is the claim that unequal treat-
ment of various minorities pervades each stage of the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system, as reflected in buy-and-bust operations, racial profiling, street
sweeps, and other police activities that have targeted people in low-in-
come communities populated mainly by minorities.5  This argument
states that a cyclical, self-perpetuating aspect to the treatment of certain
minorities exists in the American criminal justice system, stemming from
the perception by enforcement officers and decision-makers in the pro-
cess that minorities commit most crimes and that most crimes are com-
mitted by minorities.6  While empirically false, these perceptions have
directed a disproportionate amount of law enforcement attention on mi-
norities, in turn leading to disproportionate arrests of minorities, ulti-
mately resulting in racial disparities in incarceration rates.7  These claims
are also bolstered by statistical studies stating that of the more than two
million adults imprisoned in the United States at one time, about 70% are
non-Whites,8 and that though African-Americans make up only about
13% of the U.S. population, they represent nearly 50% of the adult popu-
lation in federal, state, and local prisons and jails.9  Another study shows
3. Heather Mac Donald, supra note 1; Homicide Trends in the U.S, supra note 2.
4. Heather Mac Donald, supra note 1.  This statistic is based on a 1978 report con-
ducted in eight cities and review data on robbery and aggrevated assault. Id.
5. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, CRIME & PUNISHMENT: THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND PUNITIVE DRUG LAWS 1 (2002).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Angela Y. Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex,
CORPWATCH (Sept. 1, 1998), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=849.  On June 30,
2007 state and federal prision authorities maintained jurisdiction over 1,595,034 adults, and
had custody of over 2.3 million. WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 1 (June
2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf.  Minorities (Black
and Hispanic) make up 57.6% of the total number of inmante population, although 63%
can be categorized as non-White. Id. at 7 tbl.9.  Black males ages thirty to thirty-four were
incarcerated at the highest rate, 10,688 for every 10,000 residents. Id. at tbl.10.
9. African-Americans and the Criminal Injustice System, PRISON ACTIVIST RES. CTR.,
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/racism.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  In looking at the most
recent data, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2010 the percentage of Blacks in
the United States is 12.6% and the the most recent statistics from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics places the number of Blacks in the prision system at just over 39%. USA Quick
Facts from the Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
States/00000.html (last revised Oct. 13, 2011); WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER C. WEST,
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that African-American men have a 32% chance of spending time in
prison in their lifetimes, while Hispanic men have a 17% chance, con-
trasted with Caucasian males, who have only a 6% chance.10
Such statistical studies are routinely used by those who argue that ra-
cial discrimination does indeed exist in, if not permeate, the U.S. criminal
justice system; but when the U.S. Supreme Court held in McCleskey v.
Kemp11 that such a claim would have no limit given its basis, proponents
of racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system were dealt a
severe blow.12  Debates have consistently rejected arguments claiming
that these studies should have an effect on individual cases,13 making it
difficult to prove that racial discrimination exists in the American crimi-
nal justice system, rendering possible remedies even more unattainable.
Today, the debate goes on.  Some argue that the war on drugs, resulting
in a significant surge in arrests and incarcerations over the past four de-
cades, has disproportionately affected African-Americans.14  Others
counter that even if more African-Americans are arrested and prosecuted
on drug charges than Caucasians, the number associated with the dispar-
ity—about five thousand additional arrests per year—is insignificant in
relation to the disproportionality of the prison population related to Afri-
can-Americans.15  Furthermore, the statistics stating that African-Ameri-
cans have committed fifty-two percent of all murders within American
borders from 1976 to 2005 should be reviewed in the context of a few
questions: Have all murders in this period been solved?  Were African-
Americans disproportionately targeted in investigations of murders?
Were all African-Americans who were convicted of murder in this time
period rightfully convicted?  This last question goes to the heart of the
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008
17 tbl.17 (Mar. 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf.
10. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PRISONERS (2011), avail-
able at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_factsAboutPris-
ons_Jun2011.pdf.
11. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987) (holding that use of the Baldus
study, which showed a racial disparity in sentencing, was insufficient to support petitioner’s
claims of “a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias”); Jonathan D. Glater, Race Gap:
Crime vs. Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 19666687.
13. Glater, supra note 12.  Prosecutors and resarchers agree that “statistics cannot
possibly capture the whole story . . . .” Id.
14. Bill Quigley, Fourteen Examples of Racism in Criminal Justice System, HUF-
FINGTON POST (July 26, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-quigley/four-
teen-examples-of-raci_b_658947.html  (supporting the proposition that the U.S. justice
system is racist).  The author discusses the statistics surrounding stops, arrests, bail, legal
representation, sentencing, and parole terms. Id.  He finds that at each step of the process
minorities are subject to bias. Id.
15. Mac Donald, supra note 1.
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debate as to whether racial discrimination is a driving force within the
U.S. criminal justice system, and that debate goes and on, and on, and on.
In fact, this debate seemingly has no end, leading to the question: How
can one solve a problem if there is no agreement that the problem even
exists?  Equally problematic is that even if there is agreement that the
problem exists, what is the solution?  Author Jerome G. Miller states that
when he finished the first draft of his book, his editor had one comment:
the final chapter was too pessimistic, offering too few solutions as to how
problems should be addressed.16  “If you don’t have any suggestions for
future policy,” his editor said, “why write the book?”17  That question
applies to this piece as well as to an even broader issue: if the problem of
racial discrimination can’t be demonstrated, why write about it at all?  On
the other hand, if the problem of racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal
justice system can be shown to exist, an even larger task is at hand: what
are the solutions?
One statement is clear: given the disproportionate representation of
minorities in various stages of the American criminal justice system, some
kind of problem exists.  What exactly that problem is, and whether or not
the problem has been correctly characterized is consistently debated.
One thing can be agreed on: A problem does exist and therefore some
consideration should be given to the problem.  When considering the
bleakness of Jerome Miller’s belief as to the difficulty of fashioning a so-
lution to the problem through working within the confines of the U.S.
criminal justice system, the answer seems to be: Look elsewhere, outside
of the United States.
Part II of this Article describes the roots of international human rights
law as related to the prohibition of racial discrimination in general, fol-
16. JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 235 (1996). Francis Sandiford writing a review of the book for
the Library Journal stated:
The title of this volume is a military term that means “find the enemy and eliminate
it.”  This is exactly what Miller, cofounder of the National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives, says the American justice system is doing to African[-]American males.
Drawing on statistics and examples from the criminal justice system, Miller concludes
that crimes committed by [B]lack men are treated by the courts with unnecessary se-
verity.  He also points out racial bias in the war on drugs and in public housing, as well
as the consequences of the “bell curve” and other genetic research. Voluminous notes
and references back up his Statements.  His book should be valuable reading for social
workers and criminal justice students as well as general readers.
Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/Search-Destroy-African-American-Criminal-Justice/dp/05217438
18/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1319297223&sr=8-1 (last visited Oct. 22).
17. MILLER, supra note 16, at 235 (1996). Miller responded by stating that “[t]he truth
is, I don’t have many suggestions- and those I do have, aren’t likely to be taken.” Id.
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lowed by a discussion of racial discrimination as it has existed in Ameri-
can society.  Part III sets out various examples of racial discrimination to
illuminate how the problem can play out, from wrongful accusations to
the courtroom.  These examples will be presented in an effort to explain
the statistics that are often quoted, followed by a summary of some of
those statistics designed to show which minorities are affected.  The foun-
dations of racial discrimination in U.S. law will then be discussed in Part
IV which includes more statistics and examples showing the extent of the
problem in the criminal justice system.  Part V presents potential domes-
tic solutions, including those that have already been tried and those which
offer hope.  Finally, the role of evolving international human rights law
will be examined in Part VI, adding to the pool of potential solutions and
showing that the most effective solutions may be in this realm.  A look to
the future concludes this piece.
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN GENERAL
Under international human rights law, racial discrimination has been
prohibited since the worldwide human rights movement in the post-
World War II era.18  In the decades that followed, United Nations mem-
ber countries have at various times joined forces to take actions to pro-
tect the citizens of the world from racial discrimination.  Multiple treaties
which deal directly with the problem, established monitoring mecha-
nisms19 and put in place courts in which persons or States can be held
accountable for violations of the prohibitions against racial discrimina-
tion.20  Many countries saw their citizens engage in racial discrimination
for decades, if not centuries, in the years leading up to World War II and
18. E.g., Economic and Social Council Res. E/4393, Official Records, May 8-June 6,
1967, U.N. GAOR 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, E/RES/1235(XLII) (June 6, 1967); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/
RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966); International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
19. There are two types of mechanisms for monitoring human rights violation in the
United Nations. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, UN.ORG, http://
www.un.org/rights/HRToday/hrmm.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  The first mechanism is
specific treaty bodies, which are considered as the conventional mechanism, such as the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee on Racial Discrimination (CERD).
Id. These bodies work to monitor and implement the provision of established treaties. Id.
The second mechanism is “extra-conventional” mechanisms which allow for a “more flexi-
ble response to serios human rights violations.” Id.
20. One such court is the International Court of Justice, “one of the six principal or-
gans of the United Nation.” The Court, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/
court/index.php?p1=1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
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had done nothing about it, and some governments even condoned or par-
ticipated in the acts of discrimination.  While the atrocities of World War
II served to jolt the world into taking action against racial discrimination,
many of the nations that joined forces within the United Nations to begin
to formally address the problem and attempt to eradicate it have contin-
ued to see their citizens victimized by racial discrimination in many facets
of life, from the arenas of education, employment, and housing to the
court system and the halls of justice.
A. Racial Discrimination in the United States
The United States has its own inglorious history of racial discrimina-
tion.  From the time that the first European settlers staked their claim
and built their homesteads in what was then known as the New World in
the early 1600s, the people whose descendants would eventually become
the citizens of the United States of America engaged in various forms of
racial discrimination, most horrifically in the practice of enslaving the
peoples of Africa21 and in their treatment of Native Americans.22  Since
the 1950s, members of minority races have faced discrimination in many
areas of life, purely because of their racial origin.23  Thus, for decades
after the beginnings of the worldwide human rights movement in which
the countries of the globe now take part, the United States—despite its
presence on the world front as an enforcer of democratic freedom24—
many minority citizens have continued to face various forms of discrimi-
nation based on their race.  One of these areas is the U.S. criminal justice
system.
21. While slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the stuggle for African-American equality persisted throughout what was
known as the Reconstruction era.  Erica Mirehouse, Comment, Minority Voting Rights: Is
Cumulative Voting a Valid Remedy for Violations of the Voting Rights Act or An Impermis-
sible Tactic to Advance Racial Politics?, 14 SCHOLAR 521, 526 (2011).  During this time
Southerners created Black Codes to replace the previous Slave Codes. Id. at __ n.27.
22. The plight of Native Americans is most dramatically seen in the example of the
Trail of Tears conducted under the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. See Everett Saucedo,
Comment, Curse of the New Buffalo: A Critique of Tribal Sovereignty in the Post-IGRA
World, 3 SCHOLAR 71, 72 n.2 (2000) (detailing the events surrounding the Trail of Tears).
23. One example is the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.  Art
Alcausin Hall, There is a Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to Repairations: A Critique of
the Underlying Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of African-American Reparations, 2
SCHOLAR 1, 14 (2000).
24. Such examples include participation in the Korean Conflict of the 1950s, the Viet-
nam War of the 1960s and 70s, and the current conflict in Iraq.  For a discussion on the
United States as the defender of democracy see Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Why the United States
Should Spread Democracy, Discussion Paper 98-07, Cntr. for Sci. & Int’l Affairs, Harvard
University (March 1998), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/
why_the_united_States_should_spread_democracy.html.
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Martin Luther King Jr., a civil rights advocate, saw the struggle for civil
rights in the United States as a subset of the struggle for human rights in
the world.25  In fact, he advocated for the rights of all people, regardless
of race, color, or national origin—rights which were and are considered
human rights on the international stage.26  Integral to those rights are
those rights given to a person accused of a crime.  Here, many nations
have failed and continue to fail to protect and preserve those rights, in-
cluding the United States, as evidence shows that racial discrimination
against many minority races amongst its citizens still exists today.  Given
that Martin Luther King Jr. saw the U.S. civil rights movement within the
context of an overall human rights movement, he probably would not be
surprised to see how the international human rights system and interna-
tional human rights law can potentially be used to combat racial discrimi-
nation in the U.S. criminal justice system.
B. International Human Rights Law in the Battle Against Racial
Discrimination
The United Nations General Assembly adopted The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights as a non-binding resolution on December 10,
1948.27  Since that time, nations have attempted, with varying degrees of
effort and success, to abide by its principles and adhere to its mandates.
Fifty-six nations, including the United States, were members of the
United Nations at the time of the Declaration’s adoption.28  Since its
signing approximately 150 additional nations have joind the U.N. and
have been held by the world to its standards.29
Several components of the Declaration purport to protect individuals
against racial discrimination.  Article 1 of the Declaration states: “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”30  Article 2
states: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”31  Article 7 states: “All are equal before
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of
the law.  All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
25. THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1 (2007).
26. Id.
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18.
28. Id.
29. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is It Still
Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 253 (2008).
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18, at ¶ 1.
31. Id. at ¶ 2.
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violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimi-
nation.”32  Article 8 states: “Everyone has the right to an effective rem-
edy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”33  Article
9 states that “[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile,”34 and Article 10 proclaims that “[e]veryone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.”35  Article 11 further cements the protec-
tions of the individual in the criminal justice system: “Everyone charged
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guaran-
tees necessary for his defence.”36
Three additional Articles contained in the Declaration—Articles 16,
22, and 26—reference protections against either race or discrimination.37
Perhaps it is sufficient to say that nearly every Article of the Declaration
begins with the phrase: “Everyone has the right.”38  The Declaration as a
32. Id. at ¶ 7.
33. Id. at ¶ 8.
34. Id. at ¶ 9.
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18, at ¶ 10.
36. Id. at ¶ 11.
37. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 22, 26.
Article 16.  (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nation-
ality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.  They are entitled to
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.  (2) Marriage shall
be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.  (3) The
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protec-
tion by society and the State.
. . .
Article 22.  Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.
. . .
Article 26.  (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher ed-
ucation shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.  (2) Education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  It shall promote understanding,
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.  (3) Parents have a
prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children
Id.
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
384 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:375
whole simply does not tolerate the exclusion of anyone from any right of
man.
Since the ground-breaking adoption of the Declaration, two other
milestone achievements have taken place to complete the defining pro-
tection of individual’s rights in every nation: the drafting of, and the
adoption by, the United Nations of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).39  Together with the Dec-
laration on Human Rights, these three documents have become known as
the International Bill of Human Rights.40  The creation of these human
rights instruments, so necessary to the advancement of the human rights
movement, is perhaps the most prominent contribution to the wellbeing
of mankind ever made by the United Nations.41  And yet, where does the
world today stand in measurement against these standards of human
rights?  And where, in particular, does the United States stand?
The drafters of the United Nations Charter in the post-World War II
era were no doubt aware of the importance of their endeavor, the goal of
which was to save nations of the world from future world wars.42  How-
ever, they most likely did not imagine that they were also in the process
of inventing an international human rights law system.43  Furthermore, by
doing so, another part of the U.N. charter—Article 2, paragraph 7—
raised a question as to whether issues related to the enforcement of
39. High Comm’r for Human Rights, On the Occasion of the 62nd Session of the Com-
mission on Human Rights 4 (Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.treatycouncil.org/PDF/HC.
OPENING.FINAL.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. U.N. Charter pmbl.  The preamble, signed June 26,1945 State four aims:
• save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom
Id.
43. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 39.  The High Commis-
sioner Stated:
[T]he Commission [on Human Rights] has built the framework for international
human rights protection and has steadily continued to set standards on a wide range of
human rights issues.  The past [sixty] years have seen the establishment of a far-reach-
ing, broadly encompassing normative framework in which many rights have been
clearly articulated and enshrined as universal legal entitlements.
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human rights among its members was excluded from its agenda.44  How-
ever, as many mechanisms exist within the realm of the international
human rights law system, not only within the United Nations but beyond,
a focus can and should be placed on various national systems to correct
their wrongs and bring them in-line with the agendas first articulated by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  One of those national sys-
tems is the criminal justice system, and one of those agendas is the elimi-
nation of racial discrimination therein.
III. EXAMPLES OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Racial discrimination in the criminal justice system in the United States
manifests itself in many forms.  All too frequently, the effects of this type
of discrimination are seen in the processes of initiating criminal charges
against defendants, of attempting to select an impartial jury of peers, of
striving to give these defendants a fair trial, and subsequent appeals.  De-
spite attempts to cleanse our criminal justice system of such deleterious
effects—and despite our claims that the system is so cleansed, i.e., that
the law is blind to prejudices—those who are a part of the criminal justice
system have not managed to accomplish this task.  Countless examples of
racial prejudice exist, permeating the processes noted above, despite the
hallowed nature of these processes.  Indeed, the ability of people to rid
themselves and society of all traces of racial prejudice has arguably al-
ways been questionable, leading to a possible conclusion that so long as
different races exist, racial prejudice will exist and will put its mark on all
human endeavors.  Justice systems throughout the world have been no
exception to this sad proposition, and minorities will continue to be sub-
ject to injustice in the criminal justice system, both in the United States
and abroad unless something is done about it.
A. Wrongful Accusations
With respect to criminal charges, racial prejudice can come into play
both in charging an individual with a crime based on the race of the vic-
tim, or based on the race of the accused.  Examples of how these dynam-
ics work in the U.S. criminal justice system are illustrative.  In one
infamous case, a African-American man named Willie Bennett was ar-
rested under suspicion of murdering a pregnant Caucasian woman and
her unborn baby in Boston, Massachusetts in October of 1989.45  The vic-
44. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (prohibiting the U.N. from intervening in issues that
lie within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation).
45. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 3–5 (1992) (detailing the facts of Willie Bennett’s arrest as an
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tim’s husband, a Caucasian man named Charles Stuart, had been shot in
the stomach at the same time that his wife had been shot in the face and
killed.46  He described the assailant as being African-American, six feet
tall, and approximately thirty years of age, certainly a general description
entailing no specifics that might otherwise help police narrow down the
search for the murderer.47  As the case drew the attention and scrutiny of
the nation through the news media, Boston police concentrated their in-
vestigation efforts on public housing projects in the area surrounding the
street on which the killing had taken place.48  The residents of these hous-
ing projects were mainly African-Americans and other minorities.49  Two
weeks after the murder, police arrested Bennett for a traffic violation.50
Noting his previous criminal record, that he was thirty-nine years old, and
that he was African-American, the police decided to show a photo of
Bennett to Stuart, and to arrange a lineup containing Bennett for Stuart
to view.51  Stuart claimed that Bennett looked most like the gunman who
shot and killed his wife, leaving the nation and the Boston police to feel
comfortable that they had their suspect, even though no other corrobora-
tive evidence was given.52  As it turned out, Bennett didn’t look at all like
the killer: the killer wasn’t African-American, but Caucasian, and the
killer turned out to look very much like Charles Stuart, the husband.53
Early in the following January after Carole Stuart’s brother implicated
Charles Stuart in the killing of his wife and unborn child, Stuart commit-
ted suicide, rather than face charges for the crime.54  Thus ended the
ordeal of an innocent Black man charged with a crime he didn’t commit
based on a flimsy description and a police-aided identification.55  The ra-
cial discrimination that occurred in Bennett’s case is easy to see: for Stu-
art, it was all too easy to deflect attention away from himself by falsely
accusing an African-American man for his own crime; no one questioned
the credence of his claim.  Also, law enforcement authorities did not hesi-
tate to obtain the identification of a person who had become a suspect
based on the fact that he fit a description covering millions of people and
example of how a suspect’s race can draw a conclusion of guilt when they are in fact
innocent).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution
and Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REV. 403, 423 (1994).
55. Id.
2011] INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 387
happened to be driving in the area of the killing. Would the same have
occurred if the identified perpetrator was a Caucasian man?56  If this hy-
pothetical is revised to make the victims African-American, does such a
false identification become even less likely to have any perceived
credence?
Examples of wrongful accusation, arrest, or detainment tend to drift
from people’s minds, as the victim of such indignation is viewed as being
somehow exonerated or cleansed of the accusation.  Some may even go
so far as to point out that in the Willie Bennett case, the criminal justice
system worked.  Willie Bennett, however, was still clearly a victim of ra-
cial bias in the criminal justice system, given the flimsy basis of his detain-
ment and the complicity of the police in so quickly helping to bolster a
growing fabrication.  His emotional anguish and frustration at being an
innocent man accused of a crime that got him national attention, and the
associated feeling of disenfranchisement were the prices he paid for being
a African-American man in the wrong place at the wrong time.57
B. Racial Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process
While wrongful accusations, wrongful convictions, the denial of ap-
peals, and sentencing based on racial prejudice are more dramatic types
of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system58—racial prejudice
also comes into play in more subtle ways, such as in jury selection.59  This
is equally as damaging to victims as the types of behaviors condoned or
conducted by law enforcement authorities and prosecutors, and lead
more directly to false accusations and wrongful convictions.  The reason
is because it can have the same result, even without the more overt be-
haviors such as aiding in false identifications, coercing confessions, with-
holding evidence, and the like.60  It can be insidious to the process of
56. For one, I cannot see the Boston Police doing the same had the false description
been of a Caucasian man of slightly above-average height and in his thirties.  Would police
have shown the photo of every Caucasian man who loosely fit this description, who had a
criminal record, and who happened to be stopped for a traffic infraction near the site of the
crime to the fraudulent victim and then been satisfied as to the suspect’s probable guilt
with no other corroborative evidence?  I think not.
57. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 5.  Upon hearing that the murderer may have
been Stuart himself Bennett Stated, “his life had ‘been ruined and no one is willing to take
responsibility.’” Id.
58. As they often lead to severe emotional distress, loss of liberty, and possibly even
loss of life.
59. See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 201 (2001) (detailing White juror bias against minority defendants).
60. Id. at 202–03.
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seeking justice, as it is often undetectable or difficult to prove.61  For ex-
ample, if a person is convicted based on racial bias on the part of a jury or
even outright application of racial hatred, regardless of whether or not
any racial animus has affected the investigation or prosecutorial process,
the result is the same: an innocent person is convicted, solely on the basis
of race.62  This type of bias can infiltrate a jury due to the very composi-
tion of a given community, or the subset of people who have been sum-
moned for potential jury selection.63  Often, however, racial bias can
affect a jury’s decision as a result of careful use of the jury selection pro-
cess, including the peremptory challenge.64
Difficult to measure, the selection of a jury based on racial factors is a
prevalent practice in the United States because of the existence of the
peremptory challenge in the jury selection process.65  A close look at the
peremptory challenge shows why. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines
“peremptory” as “not providing an opportunity to show cause why one
should not comply,”66 and “peremptory challenge” as “a challenge (as of
a juror) made as of right without assigning any cause.”67 Barron’s Law
Dictionary defines the word “peremptory” in the legal sense as “absolute,
conclusive, final, positive, not admitting of question or appeal.”68 Bar-
ron’s Law Dictionary elaborates further on the concept, defining “per-
emptory challenge” as “challenges which may be made without any
specific reason or cause.  The right to a peremptory challenge is not in-
tended to enable a party to select particular jurors but to exclude from
the jury persons whom he is unable successfully to challenge for cause.”69
As such, the peremptory challenge, as originally created and used, be-
came a means by which a juror could be stricken from a jury for any
reason, and that strike could not be questioned.  Thus, the justice system
created a legal means by which the same underlying racial prejudice that
led to abuses of the system, which would be subject to penalty if uncov-
ered, now offered the same type of people a legal means by which to
effect the desired results of their hatred.  That was true until the law be-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Emily C. Jeffcott & Mikal C. Watts, What’s Required to Remedy Juror Discrimina-
tion? A Brief Discussion on Batson and its Available Remedies, 13 SCHOLAR 615, 615–16
(2011).
64. Id. at 616.
65. Id.
66. Peremptory – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/peremptory (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
67. Peremptory Challenge – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/peremptory-challenge (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
68. BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 372 (5th ed. 2003).
69. Id. at 73 (internal citation omitted).
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gan to change the meaning of the peremptory challenge as practically
applied, in an effort to curb such abuses.70
In the United States today, using peremptory challenges to strike jurors
solely for the purpose of excluding certain members of a race is a viola-
tion of an individual’s constitutional right to equal protection under the
law.71  This law began to take shape in 1965 in the Supreme Court case
Swain v. Alabama,72 in which the petitioner moved to quash his indict-
ment and void his jury based on allegations of discrimination in the jury
selection process.73  In Swain, the petitioner demonstrated under-
representation of his race in the venire—the pool of prospective jurors—
as compared with the overall population of eligible jurors in the commu-
nity.74  Petitioner pointed to the fact that no African-American man had
ever served on a grand or petit jury in the Circuit Court of Talladega
County, Alabama as a clear indication of how the use of peremptory
strikes had been perverted into a scheme to deny African-Americans
equal protection of the law.75  Although the Court did rule in favor of the
state in the case, it did not rule on the constitutionality of the peremptory
strike system in Talladega County, thus opening the door for a future
challenge.76  Thus, the implication in the Court’s decision was that if a
petitioner could establish a pattern of purposeful discrimination in the
jury selection process of a given case, a violation of equal protection
would exist.77
Then, in 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky,78 the United States Supreme
Court articulated the procedure for establishing a prima facie case for
purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.79
The defendant must first show that he belongs to a specific racial group.80
Defendant must also show that the exercise of peremptory challenges re-
70. Jeffcott & Watts, supra note 63, at 616.
71. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
72. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
73. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965).  Swain, a Black man, was convicted of
rape by an all-White jury in Alabama and was sentenced to death. Id. at 204–06.  In his
petition, he asserted that 26% of the people eligible for jury duty in the jurisdiction of his
trial were Black, and yet only 10%–15% of the venires were Black. Id. at 206.
74. Id. at 206.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 228 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the Court did not decide this
constitutionality issue).
77. See generally Swain, 380 U.S. 202 (discussing elements necessary to prove pur-
poseful discrimination).
78. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
79. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986).
80. Id.
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moved members of the defendant’s race from the venire.81  Finally, the
opponent of the peremptory challenge must show “that such facts and
any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury
on account of their race.”82  Upon the defendant establishing his or her
prima facie case to rebut the assumption of discrimination, the prosecu-
tion must show “a neutral explanation for challenging [B]lack jurors.”83
The enduring result of Batson is this process of evaluating claims of
racial discrimination in the jury selection process.  However, means still
exist to circumvent the underlying justice that the Batson court was seek-
ing to enforce. Specifically, so long as the prosecutor can come up with a
plausible reason for striking a juror, the strike will be allowed, even if
they were motivated by racial prejudice.84
The entire debate and legal battle over the issue of using peremptory
strikes in a racially discriminatory manner implies that racial discrimina-
tion can and does exist in the jury system; otherwise members of one race
would not expend any effort to ensure that members of that race sat on
the juries deciding their cases or struck members of a race from a jury in
order to win a case for their clients.  In a race-neutral society, the racial
makeup of a jury in a trial would have no bearing on the verdict.85  And
so, as we strive to put in place laws to check and balance our criminal
justice system in the United States and to prevent racially discriminatory
practices within it, at the same time, we must necessarily acknowledge its
existence.
C. Wrongful Convictions
When racial animus by members of the criminal justice system leads to
a wrongful conviction; the accused can face damaging and life altering
consequences.86  A primary illustratration is the case of Clarence Bran-
dley.87  In the town of Conroe, Texas in 1981, Brandley was convicted of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Batson, 476 U.S. at 80.  The prosecutor cannot exclude members of a specific race
on grounds that they may be sympathetic to the defendant because of shared ancestry;
instead the prosecutor must be able to provide a race-neutral explanation that addresses
the specific case to be tried. Id.
85. Cf. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 59 (arguing that race of the defendant does
in fact play a primary role in the juries determination of guilt).
86. See Fair, supra note 54, at 427–31 (1994) (indicating the ways that negative circum-
stances and racial animus interact, often leading to wrongful convictions).
87. Id.
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raping and murdering sixteen-year-old Cheryl Fergeson.88  Fergeson dis-
appeared from the halls of Conroe High School just prior to the start of a
volleyball game.89  About two hours after the game, her body was found
inside the school’s auditorium by two janitors, Henry Peace and Clarence
Brandley; Brandley was the supervising janitor and the only Black janitor
on the staff.90  The two janitors quickly became the first suspects in the
case and shortly thereafter, Brandley became the only suspect.91  Accord-
ing to Peace, one of the first officers who interviewed them stated “[o]ne
of the two of you is going to hang for this,” and then turned to Brandley,
used a racial slur and said, because of Brandley’s race, “[y]ou’re
elected.”92  Despite passing a polygraph exam, Brandley was arrested and
charged with capital murder only one week after the crime.93
The police based their case against Brandley on two pieces of evidence
found on the victim’s clothes: strings similar to those from a janitor’s mop
and hair samples that were allegedly similar to Brandley’s, though they
were never tested.94  In addition, Peace, who actually discovered the body
first, told authorities that Brandley had suggested repeatedly that he
should closely inspect the auditorium.95  It was upon this weak, circum-
stantial evidence that Brandley was arrested.96
Brandley’s next stop was an appearance before an all-White grand
jury.97  Unable to produce a corroborated alibi as to his whereabouts
when Fergeson disappeared, he was indicted for murder.98  He then faced
another all-White jury at his first trial, which ended in a hung jury; the
lone holdout for a not-guilty verdict was continuously harassed during
88. Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); RADELET ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 125.
89. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 701; RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 120.
90. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 701–02; RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 120–21.
91. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 120.
92. Id. at 121, 131.  “A criminal justice system that acquiesces in this kind of racial
animus is not worthy of respect.  Brandley’s conviction should have been presumptively
invalid upon proof of the officer’s statement.  The statement reflects the environment that
produced Brandley’s conviction.”  Fair, supra note 54, at 428.
93. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 120.  Both Brandley and Peace were given
polygraphy tests two days after the murder. Id.  With pressure on the police to make an
arrest prior to the start of the school year, a decision to arrest Brandley was made quickly.
Id.
94. Id. at 122.
95. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 702.
96. Id. at 699 (stating the the conviction was based on circumstantial evidence); Fair,
supra  note 54, at 428.
97. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 123.
98. Id. In his first trial Brandley testified that “‘he sat around smoking and listening
to the radio when he should have been working.”’  But his “apparent[ ] causual atti-
tude . . . made him look untrustworthy.” Id.
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deliberations for siding with a Black person.99  In Brandley’s second trial,
three of the other four janitors on duty the day of the rape and murder
provided testimony supporting each other’s alibis and asserted that only
Brandley held keys to the auditorium.100  Brandley was convicted of mur-
der and subsequently sentenced to death.101
After Brandley’s intial sentencing, new evidence, witnesses, facts, and
the biases of the Conroe justice system came to the attention of Bran-
dley’s lawyers.102  As Brandley’s attorneys began preparing his appeal,
they discovered that a majority of the three hundred exhibits used during
his second trial had mysteriously disappeared, including the hair samples
that were used against him but never tested.103  Four years later, Bran-
dley’s appeal was denied, and he was given his first execution date: Janu-
ary 16, 1986.104  His lawyers then sought a writ of habeas corpus, which
was granted, providing him with a stay of execution.105
99. Id. at 124.  The individual juror who refused to find Brandley guilty later indicated
that when his vote became public he faced continuous harassment. Id.
100. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 702 (stating that they waited over forty-five minutes for
Brandley to arrive with the keys to let them into the building); RADELET ET AL., supra note
45, at 121–23.
101. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 701.
102. See Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (detailing the
rampant injustice of the investigation and prosecution of Mr. Brandley).
103. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 125.  The disappearance occurred while in the
custody of the prosecution and could have helped to prove Brandley innocent. Id. In all
166 of the 309 exhibits were gone. Id.
104. Id at 126.
105. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 894.  A woman named Brenda Medina came
forward from a town near Conroe, Texas, and stated that her estranged common-law hus-
band, James Dexter Robinson, had committed the rape and murder of which Brandley had
been convicted.  RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 126–27.  When she spoke to a prosecu-
tor about the case, however, the prosecutor dismissed her as not believable and conse-
quently did not give the defense her information. Id. at 127.  In addition to Ms. Medina’s
statement the testimony of the other janitors began to change. Id. One of them, John
Sessum, who had testified at the first trial but not the second, recanted his testimony dur-
ing the habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 888.  Sessum now
claimed that he had seen one of the other janitors, Gary Acreman, speaking with Fergeson
just before the rape and murder, and Acreman had threatened him not to tell anyone
about this fact. Id. Adding further support to Acreman’s involvement, Acreman’s father-
in-law, Edward Payne, told the court that Acreman had informed him where Fergeson’s
clothes were hidden on the night of the crimes. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 127.
When he reported the information to the district attorney’s office, Payne was told that the
office “was not interested,” and Payne asserts that he was threatened to “keep his goddam
mouth shut!” Id. Despite Robinson’s dismissal from his job as a janitor at Conroe High
School one month earlier, Acreman finally admitted that he saw him on school grounds the
day of the murder. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 922 n.10.  Ms. Medina also testified
that Robinson had told her that he had committed a murder and was going to have to leave
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After garnering national attention, Brandley started to head down a
path to freedom.106  In February of 1987, about one thousand people
marched in Conroe to protest the injustice to which Brandley had been
subjected to for five years.107 Shortly therafter, John Sessum (one of the
other janitors on duty the day of the murder) stated that he’d seen Gary
Acreman (a janitor also present) and James Robinson (a former Conroe
High janitor) with Fergeson, and that he’d heard the victim’s cries coming
from a bathroom.108  Sessum made a videotaped statement and after be-
ing shown the tape, Acreman accused Robinson of the crime and claimed
to have witnessed Robinson disposing of Fergeson’s clothes in the dump-
ster.109  Apparently this new evidence created enough doubt in the minds
of the court that Brandley was granted another stay of execution, just six
days before his scheduled execution date of March 20, 1987.110  On June
30, 1987 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Brandley’s habeas
petition, which eventually led to his release.111 After six long years of
injustice at the hands of a racially prejudiced criminal justice system,
Clarence Brandley was free.
D. Racial Discrimination in Sentencing
Racial discrimination is perhaps most evident in sentencing.  The Su-
preme Court considered this issue in McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987.  In Mc-
Cleskey, the petitioner appealed his case after a jury convicted him (a
Black man) of murdering a White policeman during a planned armed
robbery.112  After the verdict was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
town, which he had done by the next morning, leaving behind blood-stained sneakers. Id.
at 888 n.2.
106. Fair, supra note 54, at 430.  A made-for-television movie was created to convey
Brandley’s misfortunes. WHITEWASH: THE CLARENCE BRANDLEY STORY (Paramount
Network Television Productions 2007).
107. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 129.
108. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 888.
109. Id. at 889.
110. RADELET ET AL., supra note 45, at 131.
111. Id. at 132–33.  Judge Berchelman writing for the court stated:
Although any of these incidences alone might not support applicant’s claim, there can
be no doubt that the cumulative effect of the investigative procedure, judged by the
totality of the circumstances, resulted in a deprivation of applicant’s right to due pro-
cess of law by suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, and by creating false
testimony and inherently unreliable testimony.  Accordingly, applicant’s conviction
must be reversed.
Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 894.
112. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283–84 (1987).  The trial court, following the
recommendation of the jury, sentenced the defendant to death based on the finding of two
aggravating circumstances, and that no evidence of mitigating circumstances was presented
by the defendant in the punishment phase of his trial. Id. at 285.
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Georgia, and the U.S. Supreme Court twice denied certiorari,113 the ac-
cused filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia, claiming that Georgia’s capital sen-
tencing process was “administered in a racially discriminatory manner in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”114  The court dis-
missed the habeas corpus petition, holding that the statistical study prof-
fered by the petitioner did not demonstrate a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights and additionally dismissed, as flawed, the methodol-
ogy of the study presented by the petitioner to prove his case with regard
to his Fourteenth Amendment claim.115  Again, on appeal, the decision of
the lower court was affirmed, this time by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which assumed that the statistical study
was valid.116  Finally, on certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the statistical evidence presented was not sufficient to support the
inference that the decision makers in this specific case acted with a dis-
criminatory purpose or with any racial bias, and that the study was not
sufficient to prove either Equal Protection Clause violations or Eighth
Amendment violations as to the adoption by the state of its capital pun-
ishment statute, or its application.117  The message was clear: proving the
existence of racial discrimination in a system is not the same as proving
that racial discrimination came into play in any given case.
Although the Court did not formally acknowledge the existence of ra-
cial bias in Georgia’s administration of its death penalty, Justice Scalia
came as close as possible in his memorandum to his fellow members of
the Supreme Court prior to the issuance of the Court’s McCleskey deci-
sion.  In his memo, Justice Scalia made it clear that he disagreed with the
premise that the inferences drawn from the statistical study presented in
McCleskey were necessarily weakened by the fact that every trial and
every jury is unique.118  As a result, his memo has spawned debate that
continues to this day as to the ramifications of his views in attempts to
cleanse the criminal justice system of racial discrimination and what it
means that Justice Scalia acknowledged its existence.119  Certainly one
man’s learned opinion on the matter is not definitive—and it did not
change the course of the legal system’s rulings on such challenges, as he
113. Id. at 285–86.
114. Id. at 286.
115. Id. at 287–89.
116. Id. at 90.
117. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291, 297, 319.
118. Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies
from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L.
REV. 1035, 1038 (1994).
119. Id. at 1039–40.
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ended up voting with the majority in the ultimate opinion that went
against the petitioner—but it can be viewed as illustrative of the existence
of the problem and its ramifications on the seeking of remedies.120  For
example, if the study at issue in McCleskey, or any similar study reported
in the future, could convince the justices of the Court as to its validity and
reliability as a social science, then a strong case of intentional discrimina-
tion could be inferred in cases like McCleskey.121
E. Racial Discrimination in the Appellate System and the U.S.
Supreme Court
As shown above, racial discrimination can take place in the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system during the investigation process, the trial process, and
the appellate process.  Even in the case of Clarence Brandley, in which
the appellate part of the criminal justice system appeared to have
worked, we are left to wonder why, in the face of the earlier evidence
presented to the court; Brandley wasn’t given a new trial much sooner.
In fact, if not for the national publicity of his case, Brandley, in all likeli-
hood, probably never would have been freed.  Just as in his case, modern
studies have shown that the large majority of wrongful convictions have
been corrected through the efforts of people external to our criminal jus-
tice system, such as private detectives, journalists, family members of the
accused, or organizations that assist with overturning decisions of
wrongly convicted individuals,122 and not as a result of an appellate sys-
tem that is able to right the racial bias of the lower courts.  The McClesky
decision discussed above is an example of the failure of the appellate pro-
cess to correct the effects of racial discrimination.
However, even where the Supreme Court has rendered rulings
favorable to the elimination of racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system, these are still demonstrative of the failures of the appellate sys-
tem to correct racial bias.  In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia123
rendered invalid all then-in-effect state death penalty statutes.124  In the
opinion, three of the eight ruling justices, each writing separate opinions,
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1038 (providing that Justice Scalia recognizes the human condition as
susceptible to “irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial,” which could possi-
bly allow a study to influence judges and prosecutors).
122. Fair, supra note 54, at 431.
123. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
124. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam); Shandrea P. Solo-
mon, National Consensus, Retributive Theory, and Foundations of Justice and Morality in
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence: A Response to Advocates of the Child Rape Death Pen-
alty Statue in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 13 SCHOLAR 583, 587–89 (2011) (discussing the Courts
decision in Furman and the evolution of the Court’s stance on the death penalty).
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stated that they believed that existing state statutes allowed juries to im-
pose the death penalty on the basis of race, a clear violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.125  Thus, these three justices were in effect saying that
appellate oversight was inadequate to correct for racial injustice in ad-
ministering the death penalty. Subsequent steps were taken by the Su-
preme Court126 and by state legislatures to alleviate this problem,127 and
as a result, some measure of racial discrimination may have been re-
moved from the criminal justice system.  However, the Court hears cases
at its discretion and generally only takes on about one percent of the
cases for which writs of certirorari have been filed.128 Furman was one
instance which showed that the Court deemed that racial discrimination
had been at play in the criminal appellate system and the lower courts
and took steps to address it—but how many cases among the other
ninety-nine percent have gone unheard?
The Court’s 1996 United States v. Armstrong129 ruling provides an ex-
ample of its own contribution to racial discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system.  In Armstrong, a multitude of African-American defendants
in a California district court moved to dismiss a case of drug trafficking
against them on the grounds that they were selected for prosecution by
the government because of their race.130  When the district court ordered
the government to provide a list of similar cases over the previous three
years and to identify the race of the defendants and the selection criteria
for prosecuting those cases, California responded by asking the court to
reconsider its discovery order, arguing that the defendants in the case did
not provide any evidence of discrimination by providing evidence pur-
porting to show why the defendants had been selected for prosecution.131
Because California did not comply with the discovery order, the district
court dismissed the case against Armstrong.132  The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed en banc, holding that proof elements in a selective-prosecution
125. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240, 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (per curiam); id. at
293–95 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam); id. at 364–66, 367–69 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (per curiam).
126. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that certain
cases in Georgia and Texas that came before the Court, involving the imposition of death
as a penalty, were unconstitutional).
127. Fair, supra note 54, at 435.  Some state legislatures responded by “codif[ying]
specific aggravating factors, at least one of which had to be present before a death sentence
could be imposed.” Id.
128. Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
129. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
130. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459 (1996).
131. Id. at 459–60.
132. Id. at 461.
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claim do not require a defendant to show that the government failed to
prosecute the similarly situated.133  However, despite this ruling, the Su-
preme Court held that in a case where a defendant claims prosecution is
based on race, the defendant must show that the government decided not
to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other racial backgrounds.134
Although acknowledging due process protection against prosecution
based on arbitrary classifications such as race or religion, the Court held
that for a selective-prosecution claim to be successful the plaintiff must
show that the policy of the prosecutor’s office had a discriminatory effect
in the case and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.135  The Court
also held that, “[t]o establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race
were not prosecuted.”136  While the legal arguments used by the Supreme
Court were soundly based on precedent, this case represented an oppor-
tunity for the Court to take a stance against racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system by breaking new ground and issuing a ruling that
would have set a new precedent—one that would not allow the justice
system to so easily dodge a racial discrimination claim.
A more recent example of the Supreme Court providing opposition to
lower court efforts at correcting racially discriminatory results is Felkner
v. Jackson.137  In Felkner, the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision that determined a prosecutor’s striking of two Black prospective
jurors was sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination.138  The Su-
preme Court disregarded the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the trial
record showed disparate treatment of comparable jurors and held that
the California Court of Appeal’s ruling was “plainly not unreasona-
ble.”139  The Court further stated that the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996140 imposed a high deferential standard for re-
viewing state-court rulings, demanding that state courts “be given the
benefit of the doubt,” and that the Ninth Circuit had no basis to reach the
opposite conclusion.141  In remanding this case in a nine-to-zero vote, the
Court admonished the Ninth Circuit for its failure to mention the reason-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 465.
135. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
136. Id.
137. 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam).
138. Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (per curiam).
139. Id.  The Ninth Circuit reversed the California Court of Appeals which had up-
held the trial court’s decision that there was no evidence of purposeful discrimination. Id.
140. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 104 Pub. L. 132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
141. Felkner, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1307.
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ing applied by the lower courts in rejecting the Batson challenge, and for
ruling in a dismissive manner.142  Was the Supreme Court equally as dis-
missive in missing a chance to address a possible racially-motivated action
by prosecutors and rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s view out of hand?  The
prosecutor’s explanation as to the peremptory strikes was that one juror,
who had stated that he believed that police officers frequently stopped
him while driving because of his race and youth, may harbor police ani-
mosity, while the other juror was a social worker and the prosecutor liked
to keep social workers off his juries.143  These explanations, while sound-
ing plausible, offer plenty of room for obfuscating the truth.  Was the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that the trial record demonstrated different treat-
ment by similarly situated jurors reasonable?  Perhaps the Ninth Circuit
should have, indeed, explained its reasoning in more depth, but the Su-
preme Court allowed it no leeway.  The Court’s reliance on the deferen-
tial standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 presents a problem for appellate courts in their efforts to correct an
instance of possible racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.
F. The Victims of Racial Injustice
Who are the targets of racial discrimination in the criminal justice sys-
tem? Generally, we speak about, debate, and attempt to eliminate racial
prejudice as it relates to the people of a nation.  However, any race that is
not the majority race in a given community can be, and often is, subjected
to racial prejudice.  Thus, a smaller group of people that is comprised of a
minority race within a country’s populace can be the majority race in that
community, and subject any people who are not part of that group to
racial discrimination, thus turning a country’s majority race into a ra-
cially-discriminated-against minority in a smaller context.144  In most na-
tions of the world, the possibility for racial discrimination exists in both
142. Id.  In Batson, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a Black
man who claimed he was deprived of equal protection given the elimination of certain
potential jurors on account of their race.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).  The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the “Equal Protection Clause forbids [a] prose-
cutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race” and that to estab-
lish purposeful discrimination in the selection of a jury, the “defendant must . . . show that
he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that [the] prosecutor has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race and
that . . . other relevant circumstances raise an inference” of exclusion due to race. Id.
143. Id. at 1306.
144. See Carol Morello & Ted Mellnick, Minorities Become a Majority in Washington
Region, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mi-
norities-become-a-majority-in-washington-region/2011/08/30/gIQADobxqJ_story.html (re-
porting on the 2010 Census data and stating that: “Non-Hispanic Whites are a minority in
[twenty-two] of the country’s [one hundred]-biggest urban areas”).
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the larger and the smaller contexts, and one tends to increase the inci-
dence of the other, in an apparently never-ending cycle.  When address-
ing the concept of an entire legal system, in this case the criminal justice
system, the larger view is the concern, but it is undoubtedly affected by,
and inextricably tied to, the smaller view.
When we talk about racial discrimination in the criminal justice system
in the United States, the target of this behavior is non-Whites, as 72.4%
of the U.S. population identified themselves as single-race Caucasian in
the 2010 Census.145  The most recent census data indicates that, as far as
single-race individuals, the balance of the population was comprised pri-
marily of African-Americans (12.6%), Asians (4.8%), multi-racial people
(2.9%), Native Americans (0.9%), and Hawaiian/Pacific (0.2%).146  His-
panics, who cross racial groups, comprised about 16.3% of the popula-
tion.147  These five minority racial groups, and Hispanics, are the people
who are subjected to the vast majority of the racial discrimination that
exists in the United States generally, and in the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem in particular. The percentages cited above give perspective when ana-
lyzing statistics about crime, convictions, sentencing, and other results
when examining racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system.
Because African-Americans are the largest single-race minority in the
United States and due to the fact that our nation has historically exhib-
ited more severe racial tension between Blacks and Whites than between
any other racial minority group, efforts at eliminating racial injustice in
the United States tends to focus on the Black community.  All of the
examples of racial discrimination and prejudice cited above involve Afri-
can-American people being discriminated against by Caucasians.  How-
ever, the problem cannot be defined solely with respect to discrimination
against Blacks, of course, as discrimination against the other minorities is
also evident in American society in general, and in the criminal justice
system specifically.  While the examples involving Blacks, as noted above,
could be generalized to apply to any minority race in the United States,
and the inherent injustice would be no more or less severe, each race
tends to have to fight its own particular legacies of racial bias, based on
long-standing stereotypes that might make one race more or less prone
than another to a particular type of discrimination.  The 1992 case of
Wayne Lo is an example of how racial stereotyping of Asians, and racial
145. USA Quick Facts from the Census Bureau, supra note 9.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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bias against them, can similarly infect the criminal justice system in the
United States.148
On December 14, 1992, Wayne Lo, a nineteen-year-old Chinese-Amer-
ican, stormed the Bard College at Simon’s Rock campus, and engaged in
a shooting spree that resulted in the death of two people and the wound-
ing of four others.149  Whether or not he committed the crimes with
which he was charged was not an issue in his subsequent trial; instead, the
issue at trial was whether or not Lo was sane when he committed the
crimes.150  While the defense produced clinical psychologists who stated
that Lo was a classic paranoid schizophrenic who did not understand the
wrongfulness of what he had done and experienced bouts of suicidal de-
pression, the prosecution was able to successfully convince the jury that
Lo was a deliberate murderer who simply outsmarted people into believ-
ing that he was insane.151
Some would argue that the case of Wayne Lo is an example of Asian-
American stereotyping according to either the “Yellow-Peril” or “model
minority” theories, wherein the former suggests that migrant Asians are a
contemptible people that pose a threat to low-wage White Americans and
the latter holds that Asians possess a superior intellect and have assimi-
lated better to true American values than other minority groups.152
These theories have come into existence as a result of two distinct in-
stances of immigration into the United States by the Asian community.153
First, during the 1800s, many Chinese immigrated into the United States
as low-wage-earning workers on farms and plantations, and as a result of
being identified with these jobs, they became generally viewed by Whites
as intellectually inferior, low-class in behavior, and subsequently a threat
to job security for the American laborer.154  Second, during the period
148. Rhoda J. Yen, Racial Stereotyping of Asians and Asian Americans and Its Effect
on Criminal Justice: A Reflection on the Wayne Lo Case, 7 ASIAN  L.J. 1, 1 (2000).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 23 (noting that racial prejudice could have led jurors to fail to consider
the reasonableness of the insanity defense).
151. Id. at 27.  The prosecution also depicted Lo as homophobic and a neo-Nazi who
hated Blacks and Jews, even though none of his victims were among these groups of alleg-
edly targeted people. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 2–9.  Under the model minority view, Asians must contend with the issue
of being viewed  as being part of the White community, but failing to gain any of the
attendant benefits. Id.
153. Yen, supra note 148, at 6–7.
154. Id. (noting that, under this theory, Chinese immigrants became an even bigger
threat to American job security when they began to leave the plantations and start their
own small businesses).
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after the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965,155
which relaxed existing restrictions on Asian immigration, Asian immi-
grants came largely from the best educated and wealthiest groups of their
native countries, many of whom were recruited not for the hard labor
jobs that their predecessors filled, but as skilled workers and for profes-
sional positions.156  The experiences of White America’s interaction with
these distinct groups of Asian immigrants, tending to be on opposite ends
of the socio-economic spectrum, helped to shape the stereotypes noted in
the respective theories.157
The latter “model minority” theory could have come into play in
Wayne Lo’s case, as the jury arguably ignored the findings and testimony
of psychologists and friends as to the defendant’s mental illness, and in-
stead endorsed the stereotype of superior intelligence leading to expert
conniving and a well-planned murder.158  Lo was convicted of his crimes
and sentenced to life in prison.159
While the case of Wayne Lo does not invite the same degree of sympa-
thy as the cases of Willie Bennett and Clarence Brandley (who were
wrongly accused or convicted of crimes based on racial prejudice) it does
serve to illuminate the differences in the types of discrimination that any
given minority might face in the U.S. criminal justice system.  In addition,
plenty of examples exist as to racial injustice against Asians and other
minorities in America that are more analogous to what happened to Ben-
nett and Brandley.  For example, in January of 1993, police in Fountain
Valley, California, misidentified Mark Kanshige, a Japanese-American, as
a man wanted for attempted murder.160  His photo was included in a
facebook—a collection of photographs used to identify a suspect—pe-
rused for the purpose of picking out a suspect, and he was singled out by
155. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151) (amending the prior act signed in June of 1952).  Rhoda Yen
refers to this Act in her Article (Yen, supra note 148) as the Immigration Act of 1965.
156. Yen, supra note 148, at 2–3 (claiming that under this theory, U.S. policymakers
sought to attract Asians to fill scientific and technical positions, and thus immigration pol-
icy began to control the education and socio-economic levels of Asian immigrants in ways
that had not been done for other minorities).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 28 (noting that both Lo’s trial jury and his appellate judge concluded
that Lo’s mental illness, to whatever degree it existed, did not meet the legal standard of
insanity, but that the father of one of Lo’s victims came to believe, after the trial and
appeal, that Lo was insane when he committed the crimes).
159. Id. (alleging that Lo’s insanity defense probably would not have been rejected,
and that he would not have received a life sentence if he had been White).
160. Id. at 18.
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an eye witness.161  Based on this unreliable lead, the police did not hesi-
tate to believe that they had their suspect and forced his entire family out
of their house in handcuffs while they searched the home for nonexistent
evidence.162  Eventually, Kanshige was exonerated by a jury after being
incarcerated for six months and charged with murder.163
A more egregious example of racial injustice enacted against Asians
through the U.S. criminal justice system is that of the 1982 killing of Vin-
cent Chin, and the subsequent trials and other legal proceedings of his
killers.164  Chin’s case highlights the process of how racial discrimination
can come into play when a member of a minority is a victim in a crime,
rather than a wrongly accused suspect or defendant.165  Chin, a 27-year-
old Asian-American, was assaulted by two unemployed autoworkers that
waited for him outside a fast food restaurant and bludgeoned him to
death following an earlier altercation.166  To his assailants, two White
men named Roger Ebens and Michael Nitz, Chin’s offense was that he
was Asian, as evidenced by the fact that as a provocation in an earlier
altercation, Ebens kept referring to Chin as a “Chink” and a “Nip” and at
one point shouted “it’s because of you little mother f***ers that we’re out
of work.”167
As the first altercation was ongoing outside a strip club, where Chin’s
friends were holding a bachelor’s party in Chin’s honor, Ebens retrieved
a baseball bat and came after Chin, causing Chin and his friends to at-
tempt to flee, with both Ebens and Nitz in pursuit.168  Eventually they
caught up with Chin, and Ebens hit Chin with the bat multiple times in
161. Yen, supra note 148, at 18 (asserting that the “facebook” practice of identifica-
tion of suspects is inherently racially biased against Asians because of the stereotypical
belief that Asians all look alike and White Americans frequently cannot distinguish Asian
faces from each other).
162. Id. at 18–19 (claiming that some Asian facebooks include photos of Asian-Amer-
icans who do not have criminal records).
163. Id. at 19.  That same year, police in Garden Grove, California, illegally photo-
graphed and detained three Asian teenage girls, accusing them of being members of a gang
solely because they wore baggy pants and seemed to be loitering by a public phone. Id.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Yen, supra note 148, at 10–11 (stating that Chin’s assailants had instigated a
brawl with him at a local bar before waiting for him outside the fast-food restaurant).
167. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1427–28 (6th Cir. 1986).  Although Chin
engaged in a physical battle at a strip club with Ebens earlier in the evening, and some of
the circumstances that led to the final assault were in dispute at trial, Ebens was clearly the
aggressor in the battle that took Chin’s life. Id.
168. Id.  Apparently seeing they were outnumbered four-to-two, Ebens and Nitz of-
fered $20 to another man to help them “find and catch a ‘Chinese guy’” amid their pursuit
of Chin, lasting several blocks. Id. at 1428.
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the head and back, dropping Chin to the ground.169  Chin was subse-
quently taken to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead.170
Charged with second degree murder,171 Ebens was prosecuted in a
Michigan County Court, and eventually pled guilty to manslaughter, for
which he was fined $3,720 and placed on probation.172  The case gathered
heavy publicity not only in Michigan but nationally, and public outrage at
the lightness of the sentence was at its apex.173  At trial, Ebens stated in
testimony, ‘“I’m no racist.  I’ve never been a racist,”’ and portrayed the
incident as nothing but a drunken brawl between the men, one of whom
just happened to be Asian-American.174  However, only one of the two
combatants in this so-called drunken brawl wielded a baseball bat as a
weapon, and only one of them was bludgeoned to death.  Judge Charles
S. Kaufman, who sentenced Ebens, rationalized his leniency:
These [aren’t] the kind of men you send to jail.  We’re talking here
about a man who’s held down a responsible job with the same com-
pany for seventeen or eighteen years . . . .  These men are not going
to go out and harm somebody else.  I just [don’t] think that putting
them in prison [will] do any good for them or for society . . . .  You
don’t make the punishment fit the crime; you make the punishment
fit the criminal.175
Neither man was charged with perpetrating a hate crime.176
After the sentences were handed down and Kaufman gave his astound-
ing explanation, activism amongst Asian-American communities nation-
wide increased dramatically.177  In Detroit, an organization formed by
Asian-Americans called American Citizens for Justice demanded that the
169. Id. at 1428 (observing that whether or not Nitz held Chin while Ebens struck him
with the baseball bat was in dispute at trial).  The assault was finally stopped by police
officers working security at the McDonald’s. Id.
170. Id. (noting that doctors at the hospital attempted to perform emergency surgery
on Chin, but he was removed from life support when his brain ceased functioning).
171. Robert S. Chang, Dreaming in Black and White: Racial-Sexual Policing in The
Birth of a Nation, The Cheat, and Who Killed Vincent Chin?, 5 ASIAN L.J. 41, 55 (1998)
(explaining that Ebens eventually entered into a plea bargain with prosecutors in his case).
172. Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1425.
173. Id.
174. Yen, supra note 148, at 11 (showing that Judge Kaufman seemed to echo Ebens’s
version of events).
175. Id.  Upon hearing the judge’s statement, Chin’s mother replied, ‘“what kind of
law is this?  What kind of justice?  This happened because my son is Chinese.  If two Chi-
nese killed a [W]hite person, they must go to jail, maybe for their whole
lives . . .  Something is wrong with this country.”’ Id.
176. Id. at 12.
177. Id. at 11 (distinguishing that activism by the Asian-American community ex-
ploded while the decision was virtually ignored by White Americans).
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U.S. Department of Justice investigate the case as a violation of federal
civil rights law.178  As stated by Judge Engel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in a later federal proceeding concerning
Ebens, “[u]ndoubtedly because of [this] activity on behalf of the Chinese-
American community, the United States Department of Justice, overrul-
ing the decision of the local United States Attorney not to prosecute,
instituted proceedings under the Civil Rights Act in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.”179  Judge Engel’s
assessment as to the reason for the existence of the federal civil rights
case against Ebens was probably correct, but notably absent in the
judge’s statement as to why the case came about was the belief that the
Department of Justice had felt that it had seen enough evidence in the
case to justify bringing the charges before the court.  Judge Engel could
merely have been stating a sad reality about the case—and about the
criminal justice system in general—or he could have been inadvertently
revealing his own private bias regarding the case, or possibly both.
Eventually, both Ebens and Nitz were indicted on two counts of violat-
ing Chin’s civil rights—one a conspiracy charge—and whereas Nitz was
acquitted of both charges, Ebens was found guilty of one count of violat-
ing Chin’s rights by willfully injuring him based on his national origin.180
Ebens was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for this crime, but on
appeal, Judge Engel overturned Ebens’ conviction on two grounds: (1)
the lower court committed reversible error in refusing to allow evidence
of inconsistent statements made by witnesses to Chin’s killing as to the
racist statements made by Ebens during the altercation, and (2) the lower
court committed reversible error in permitting the testimony of a Black
man named Willie Davis, who testified as a government witness that nine
years earlier, in 1974, he was harassed with racial epithets by a man he
identified as Ebens.181  The court found that because the testimony “was
too remote in time,” the witness’s identification of Ebens “was too indefi-
nite to be probative,” and the probative value of both pieces of evidence
was outweighed by their potential prejudicial effects.182  On remand, the
lower court granted a motion for a change of venue, due to the enormous
publicity the trial was getting, and transferred the case to the Southern
178. Id.
179. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1425 (6th Cir. 1986).
180. Id. at 1472.
181. Id. at 1431–34.
182. Id. (suggesting that the testimony of the witness Davis could have been admissi-
ble if it had not occurred so remotely in time to the incident at issue in the case, and noting
that the comments to which Davis testified were directed to Davis, who was of a different
ethnicity than the victim).
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District of Ohio,183 where Ebens was acquitted.184  Ebens, because of the
lenient sentence on his state manslaughter conviction, and because he’d
posted a $20,000 bond pending his appeal of his federal civil rights convic-
tion, never served a day in jail for killing Vincent Chin.185
IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF RACIAL INJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Racial discrimination in the criminal justice system can, and does, af-
fect all minority races in this country.  Although the prejudices faced by
one minority race and not another may be different, the results are gener-
ally the same: a deprivation of civil or human rights and a deprivation of
justice.  The above illustrations highlight that there is an undeniable
prejudice in the U.S. justice system.  So now the question still remains,
what can be done to stop the injustice?
The challenge of dealing with and attempting to correct racial discrimi-
nation in the criminal justice system has been that the undertaking of the
practice of law in its various forms—in judging, advocacy, counseling,
etc.—requires interpretation and enforcement by humans, who are essen-
tially imperfect beings that tend to develop and nurture biases.186  Given
that such beings have shaped the legal system in the United States into its
current state, racial stereotyping has thus played a role in the administra-
tion and development of criminal law in the country.187  The American
legal system in general, given its reliance on the jury system, is particu-
larly vulnerable to the effects of racial stereotyping; with the inevitable
existence of some degree of either subtle or overt prejudice in people,
how likely is it that a jury of any composition can deliver the promise of
183. See id. at 145–46 (noting that all of the public outcry and publicity surrounding
the case would be significantly damaging to the jury selection process).
184. See Yen, supra note 148, at 11–12 (noting that Chin’s mother, outraged by the
outcome of the case against Ebens, left the country after the verdict and returned to
China).
185. Id. at 11–12.
186. See id. at 12–13 (providing that “[t]he model minority stereotype . . . creates the
erroneous assumption that Asians cannot be victims of racial discrimination, [and] pro-
duces potentially devastating consequences on the enforcement of crimes against Asian
Americans”); Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 59 (detailing the inborn sterotypes that
color a jurors ability to judge guilt or innocence clearly).
187. See Yen, supra note 148, at 9–10 (noting that sociological research has only
started to reveal the pervasive influence that racial prejudice against Blacks has had on the
U.S. criminal justice system, including studies which conclude that racial stereotyping of
Black defendants by prosecutors can greatly influence the perceptions of guilt developed
by jurors).  Few studies have analyzed the influence of such stereotyping of other racial
groups in the field of criminal law. Id. at 10.  Thus, expanded research on prejudice against
other racial and ethnic minorities is essential to the eradication of racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system, especially given that these minorities tend to be disproportion-
ately subjected to the criminal justice system. Id.
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impartiality in the law?188  This effect is a formidable obstacle to
overcome.
A. A Short History of the Search for Equality in America
Before examining what can be done to eliminate, or at least begin to
substantially mitigate, racial bias in the criminal justice system in the
United States, some attempt to gain an understanding of racism’s founda-
tions in the U.S. legal system should be undertaken.  The promise that
law will be blind to prejudices has been a foundation of American society
since it was established.189  But for the better part of the first century of
the existence of the United States this was of course not the case, as
Blacks were enslaved and held no rights as citizens under the legal system
in the United States.  At the conclusion of the Civil War, however, some
Whites and Blacks hoped that the distinctions that had been in existence
based on the color of people’s skin would fade away, at least insofar as
public comportment was concerned.190  By 1896, however, the legal and
political significance of race had increased.191  As the majority in Plessy v.
Ferguson192 failed to accept an equal protection challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana statute that required the segregation of Blacks
and Whites in railway cars, Justice Harlan famously proclaimed in his dis-
senting opinion:
The [W]hite race deems itself to be the dominant race in this coun-
try.  And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth
and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty.193
188. Id. at 10–12 (2000) (proposing means by which Asian-American stereotypes can
influence jurors and law enforcement officials).  As stated by Samuel Sommers & Phoebe
Ellsworth from the University of Michiagn:
On most juries, the final verdict reflects the views of the predeliberation majority.  The
pervasive and deleterious effects of White juror bias . . . . [S]alient racial issues in a
trial activate the normative racial attitudes held by White jurors.  This appears to be
true today just as it was before the Civil War.
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 59, at 202.
189. Yen, supra note 148, at 9.  “It is dubious that the law has kept its promise of
neutrality and objectivity, particularly since all law requires human interpretation and en-
forcement.” Id.
190. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Cen-
tury Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1938 (2000).
191. See id. at 1938 (discussing attitudes regarding race and “[W]hiteness” during
Reconstruction).
192. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
193. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Harlan’s point was that segregating the races did not offer equality to
each race, but instead was a means by which to signify the superiority of
one race and the inferiority of the other.194  Now, more than one hundred
years later, Harlan’s dissenting view is the majority view, both as a socie-
tal and a legal matter, as segregation has become an evil concept, and is
also considered to be presumptively unconstitutional.195  However,
Harlan’s viewpoint that the Constitution is colorblind is now perceived by
some as a coded statement of the perpetuation of the concept of racial
inequality.196
In the wake of Harlan’s pronouncement, American race law quickly
evolved down two distinct paths at the outset of the twentieth century,
one which embraced the ideals of equality and one which looked to divert
equality through legal means.197  The later used state law to further re-
strict the rights of minorities based on their race and distinctly opposed
the concept of equality.198  For example, during the early part of the
twentieth century the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine that not
only did Congress have the power to expel aliens, but that this power was
not subject to judicial review.199  As a result, in both Chae Chan Ping v.
United States200 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,201 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882,202 giving deference to a statute that prohibited Chinese nationals
from entering the United States on purely on racial grounds.203
194. Harris, supra 190, at 1926 (noting that Justice Harlan, in making his proclamation
in his dissent, declared that “our [C]onstitution is colorblind”).
195. See id. at 1926 (indicating that Justice Harlan’s statement, “our [C]onstitution is
colorblind” today serves as a guiding light in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
196. See id. at 1939–41 (2000) (discussing the view among various historians and scien-
tists that certain races were inherently superior to others).
197. Id. at 1943.
198. Id. (noting that the power of Congress to expel non-citizens is not subject to
judicial review).
199. Harris, supra note 190, at 1943.  In the first few decades of the twentieth century,
“the United States operated on the blatantly racist principles of exclusion and annexation
in its foreign relations (and its quasi-foreign relations with [American] Indians).” Id.
Through the creation of congressional “plenary power” doctrines, which limited the possi-
bility of judicial review over these racist legislative actions, the Supreme Court paved the
way for nativist racism in the form of exclusion and exploitation of non-Whites.  Id.
200. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
201. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
202. The full name of the Act is An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relat-
ing to the Chinese, Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).  The Act suspended the immigration of
Chinese laborers for ten years.  22 Stat. at 59.
203. Harris, supra note 190, at 1943–44 (noting that the Chinese Exclusion Act could
be viewed as a response to Reconstruction, as immigration from China to the western U.S.
States had surged in the late nineteenth century).
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The new constitutional principle of “equality was reconciled with de-
mands for “[W]hite supremacy . . . under a . . . rubric of racial ‘differ-
ence.’”204  Though non-White citizens were formally entitled to equality
under the law after the Civil War, the reality became something differ-
ent.205  This was a turbulent time when about four million people who
had previously been considered legal chattel became legal citizens of the
United States; when Whites in the western United States became increas-
ingly hateful of the Chinese; when Whites and Mexicans fought over land
and power in the southwestern United States; and when Whites were con-
tinuing to force American Indians off their lands.206  Congress sought
during the Reconstruction era to address these volatile issues by creating
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and a host of fed-
eral statutes designed to protect the civil rights of the individual—any
individual.207  The latter group of legislative acts, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, attempted to dismantle existing state race law and
forestall the creation of new state legislation designed to inflict racial
oppression.208
Unfortunately, after just a few years the aforementioned legislation be-
gan to be undermined.209  A lack of a solid foundation economically, and
a lack of a sound enforcement legally, created an opportunity for a hostile
Supreme Court to begin to eviscerate the rights created under the legisla-
tion of the Reconstruction, and for states to exercise their will against the
goals of the Reconstruction.210  And so, whereas the Reconstruction era
204. Id. at 1943.
205. Id. at 1957–58 (“[T]he practical reality was an end to [B]lack hopes for emancipa-
tion.”).  The United States began heading down this path in the period known as the Re-
construction, during the years 1865 to 1877. Id. at 1930–31.  in the words of historian Eric
Froner, during the Reconstruction “Americans made their first attempt to live up to the
noble professions of their political creed—something few societies have ever done.” Id.
206. Id. at 1930–31 (indicating that state policies of allotment and removal under-
mined the economies and spiritual and cultural integrity of Native Americans).
207. Id. at 1931–32 (establishing that these three amendments served to abolish slav-
ery; create a right of citizenship for all people residing in the United States; prohibit the
states from abridging the privileges and immunities of any U.S. citizen, or depriving those
citizens of equal protection under the law and due process of the law; and guarantee the
right to vote for all men, regardless of their race).
208. Harris, supra note 190, at 1932 (revealing that this legislation, coupled with the
Fourteenth Amendment, was intended to thwart the efforts of the southern states to re-
create slavery, in effect, through state laws designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of
Blacks).
209. Id. at 1933 (noting that important weaknesses in the political and legal frame-
work of the laws of the Reconstruction era enabled this undermining).
210. Id. at 1933–34 (suggesting that another weakness of the Reconstruction frame-
work that allowed its goals to be undermined was the novelty and grandiosity of its legal
structure, which led to disputes among lawmakers concerning the importance and meaning
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had struck a seemingly decisive blow to the old social and legal order,
making clear that all people were entitled to be treated as part of a na-
tional community, with legal rights that could no longer be explicitly as-
signed based on a person’s race, the decline back to a racially divided
society in a legal sense began.211
Minority citizens, particularly Blacks, were left in much the same state
that they were in before the Civil War, even though they had their free-
dom from slavery.212  As the Court, perhaps cynically or resignedly,
noted in Plessy, “[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or
to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to
do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties” that already exist.213
The realities of the first half of the twentieth century bore these words
out as seemingly prophetic.
The tide began to turn back in favor of equality among the races in the
1940s, when the United Sates began “to portray itself as a land of free-
dom and equality in light of decolonization and the Cold War.”214  In
1943, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts,215 thus beginning
the renunciation of the plenary power to exclude minorities from citizen-
ship based on race, which it had gained and wielded in the late nineteenth
century.216  After several other legislative moves which allowed citizen-
ship to people who had been racially ineligible for naturalization, Con-
gress also renounced its termination policy, which had previously left
Native Americans without legal protection or recognition, by passing a
series of federal statutes in the 1970s.217  Minorities of all racial back-
grounds were able to become U.S. citizens again, ostensibly with all of the
attached rights of citizenship that Whites enjoyed.218
The tide continued to turn further back in favor of equality amongst
the races during the 1960s, a period widely known as the Civil Rights
of the Thirteenth Amendment and the intended content of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
the language of these pieces of legislation was broad and vague).
211. Id. at 1937–38 (identifying the fact that many people who had learned to exercise
their rights and privileges as Whites could do were not about to relinquish those rights and
privileges, ensuring that the fight over the issue of race would continue).
212. Id. at 1957.
213. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543, 551 (1896) (stating also that a statute im-
plying solely a legal distinction between the races, which must exist as long as Whites are
distinguished from another race by color of the skin, does not have a tendency to destroy
the concept of legal equality of the races, or establish involuntary servitude).
214. Harris, supra note 190, at 1996.
215. An Act to Repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Pub. L. 78-199, ch. 34, 57 Stat. 600
(1943).
216. Harris, supra note 190, at 1996.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1937.
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era.219  After the start of this period, the Supreme Court began to decide
cases that would have significant implications in two key areas of civil
rights concern: equal opportunity in education, and voting rights.220  As a
result, the issue of equality among the races was fought in the courts.221
For example, whereas the Court in Plessy articulated a separate-but-equal
doctrine, the Court changed its course on June 5, 1950 when it held that
separate-but-equal was not constitutional in the higher education con-
text.222  In Sweatt v. Painter,223 the Court held that a new state law school
specifically created for Black students at the University of Texas failed to
provide equivalent educational opportunities as those offered to White
students at the same university, and thus the state, in failing to admit the
plaintiff student to its existing law school, denied the student his equal
protection rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.224  In
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,225 the Court held that the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma’s segregation policy, requiring Black students to use
separate facilities from the White students, was also in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.226  Although in both cases the Court had been
petitioned to reconsider the separate-but-equal doctrine as handed down
in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court declined to do so, choosing instead to
rule only on the specific issues in the cases at hand.227  While this failure
219. Id. at 1983.
220. Id. at 1990, 1995.
221. Harris, supra note 190, at 1957.
222. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (reversing a judgment that denied
mandamus to compel school officials of the University of Texas to admit the plaintiff, a
Black student, to its law school); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950)
(reversing a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, which did not grant the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, a Black student
seeking admission to a doctorate program at the University of Oklahoma).  The Court
assumed that the State would follow its holding that the university’s denial of admission to
the plaintiff on the basis of his race was unconstitutional; the injunctive relief sought by the
plaintiff asked that his admission be ordered by the court. Id.
223. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
224. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629 (stating that a new law school being opened exclusively
for Black students could not practically qualify as providing equal opportunity for those
Black students due to substantial differences in faculty size, library facilities, and faculty).
225. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
226. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642 (holding that an Oklahoma statute requiring that
Black students be required to sit in class, study, and eat apart from all other students was
unconstitutional).
227. See id. at 638 (noting that circumstances of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
States from treating individuals differently on the basis of race); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631–32
(stating that educational opportunities must be “substantially equal” for all in accordance
with the Fourteenth Amendment).  The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson held that an act that
requires White and Black people to be provided with separate accommodations was not in
violation of the Fourteenth or Thirteenth Amendments.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
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to obtain a full review of Plessy forced civil rights activists to pursue each
case individually, slowing the progress of the civil rights movement, but
signaling that the separate-but-equal doctrine would eventually be under-
mined.228  These decisions paved the way for the landmark 1954 decision
of Brown v. Board of Education,229 a consolidation of four cases where
Blacks were denied equal opportunity because of racial segregation.230
The decision to strike down segregation policies in Brown was clearly
applicable to public school systems in all states.231  Finally, the concept of
equality amongst people of all races was being enforced in the way that
legislators had imagined in post Civil War America.
It took eleven more years, but the civil rights movement made progress
in the criminal justice system when the federal government was called
upon by Black activists to put an end to the murders of Black people by
Whites; as southern states were unable to seat juries that would convict
Whites of killing Blacks.232  After years of political pressure having been
put on the federal government to step in and use federal civil rights law to
552 (1950).  The Court reasoned that when the government has provided its citizens with
equal opportunities to improve and progress it has performed its functions in order to
respect social advantages. Id. at 551.  The court further reasoned that the legislation does
not have the power to eradicate distinctions based on racial or physical differences. Id.
228. See Melvin I. Urofsky, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights Since 1940: Opportu-
nities and Limitations, 4 BARRY L. REV. 39, 43–44 (2003) (mentioning that McLaurin was
the first time that the Supreme Court encountered the core issue of segregation).  Al-
though Chief Justice Vinson attempted to develop a narrow opinion he noted the humilia-
tion that was faced by George McLaurin. Id. He also identified the lack of intangible
aspects that McLaurin’s White counterparts received. Id. at 43. This opinion crafted a
starting point to analyze the constitutionality of segregation. Id. at 44.
229. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
230. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954) (holding racial segregation in
public schools deprives minority students of equal opportunities in education even though
the facilities and other factors may be ostensibly equal).
231. Urofsky, supra note 228, at 45 (noting that Kenneth Karst, a nationally renowned
constitutional law scholar, proclaimed the Brown decision to be the “leading authoritative
symbol for the principle that the Constitution forbids a system of caste”).  The Court in
Brown struck down policies of segregation in public school systems of Delaware, Kansas,
South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. The Court stated that separate educational facilities
were inherently unequal. Id. For discussion of racial discrimination in Texas via state fi-
nancing schemes see Angela Maria Shimek, Comment, The Road Not Taken: The Next Step
for Texas Education Finance, 9 SCHOLAR 531, 537 (2007).
232. On June 21, 1964 in Philadelphia, Mississippi, three civil rights workers were
murdered during a voter-registration campaign for Black voters.   Margaret M. Russell,
Cleansing Moments and Retrospective Justice, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1241 (2003) (indi-
cating that an earlier attempt on the life of one of the victims, Michael Schwerner, had
been made as a result of his participation in a Black boycott of White-owned businesses
and a voter registration drive in Meridian, Mississippi).  What distinguished this case from
the previous lynching-style murders of Blacks by Whites was the fact that two of the three
civil rights workers were White northerners. Id. at 1242.
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extract justice in cases of whitewashed state murder charges, starting in
earnest with the murder of Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi in 1955, the
dynamics were finally in place to allow that pressure to bear fruit.233  In
United States v. Price,234 the Court held the federal civil rights statute,235
which makes it a conspiracy to prevent free exercise of any right secured
for citizens by the Constitution a criminal offense, includes rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.236  This decision paved the way for
progress, because state murder charges were effectively transmuted into
crimes that could be prosecuted by the federal government.237
B. A Statistical View of the Problem
Despite the progress noted in the brief history of racial bias in the U.S.
courts since the Civil War, all of the examples of racial discrimination
provided in Part III took place in the 1980s and 1990s. This is an obvious
indication that racism is still alive and well, ready to rear its ugly head,
and stand in the way of justice.  However, those examples provide merely
anecdotal evidence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system
in the United States.  What is the extent of the injustice?
Data from various studies concerning the death penalty can provide
insight into the extent that racial factors enter into decisions made in the
U.S. criminal justice system.  For example, in data from a national study
published by the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) in Washing-
ton, D.C., statistics collected on executions from 1976 (the year the Su-
preme Court reinstituted the death penalty in the United States) through
Sept. 20, 2010 show that “[o]ver 75% of the murder victims in cases re-
sulting in an execution were [W]hite, even though nationally only 50% of
total murder victims generally are [W]hite.”238  Given this significant a
233. Id. at 1231.  The murder of Emmett Till occurred during the same year that Rosa
Parks refused to give up her bus seat to a White man. Id.
234. 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (considering the issue of whether the defendants, by
conspiring to release the three civil rights workers from jail for the purpose of intercepting
them and killing them, violated 18 U.S.C. § 241).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
236. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800–01 (1966) (noting that the federal civil
rights statute also extends to conspiracies engaged in by officials, either alone or jointly
with private individuals).
237. See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VI-
OLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-Brown South 163–64 (1987) (noting
that two-and-a-half months before the FBI made the arrests concerning the disappearance
of three missing Civil Rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the Justice Department
had already assigned eight lawyers to the case, including one from the Civil Rights
Division).
238. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Facts About the Death Penalty, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
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misalignment of the incidence of the death penalty versus the incidence
of murder affecting a given race, the race of the victim does appear to be
a factor influencing the courts in sentencing decisions.  According to a
1998 report issued by Professor David Baldus to the American Bar Asso-
ciation, ninty-six percent of states that reviewed the impact of race as a
factor in deciding to sentence a defendant to death reported a pattern of
discrimination based on the “race-of-defendant,” the “race-of-victim,” or
both.239  A 2005 California study and a 2001 North Carolina study also
noted by the DPIC show a high correlation between death penalty
sentences and the race of the victim.240
Another state study of note was issued by Professors David C. Baldus,
Charles Pulaski, and George Woolworth regarding imposition of the
death penalty in Georgia.241  The Baldus study was used as the basis for
the case argued by the petitioner in McCleskey, where the authors
claimed that, using a model designed to control for thirty-nine nonracial
variables, defendants charged with the killing of Caucasians were 4.3
times more likely to get the death penalty as defendants charged with the
killing of African-Americans, and that African-American defendants
were 1.1 times more likely to be sentenced to death as other defendants
in cases involving all types of murder victims.242  Taken together, the out-
comes of these two results led to the conclusion that African-Americans
who are convicted of killing Whites in Georgia are the most likely group
to receive the death penalty.243  Other analyses performed by Baldus in-
dicated that, using raw numbers, defendants charged with the killing of
Whites got the death penalty in 11% of those cases, while defendants
charged with the killing of Blacks got the death penalty in only 1% of the
cases.244  In addition, the death penalty was imposed in 22% of cases in-
volving a Black defendant and a White victim, and in only 3% of cases
239. Id. (noting that from the time the death penalty was reinstated, 15 White defend-
ants had been put to death for murdering a Black victim, whereas 246 Blacks had been put
to death for murdering a White victim).
240. Id. (providing also that, of the thirty-eight states who invoke the death penalty,
ninty-eight percent District attorneys are White).  The California report found that killers
of Whites were more than three times as likely to get the death penalty as killers of Blacks,
and four times as likely to get the death penalty as killers of Latinos; id. (citing authors
Pierce and Radelet in the Santa Clara Law Review).  The North Carolina report concluded
that the killers of Whites were three and a half times as likely to receive the death penalty
than killers of minorities. Id. (citing a study by Dr. Isaac Unah and Professor Jack Boger
of the Univesity of North Carolina).
241. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (explaining that the Baldus report
is actually the result of two sophisticated statistical studies that examined over 2,000 mur-
der cases in Georgia in the 1970s).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 287.
244. Id. at 286.
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with a White defendant and Black victim.245  The Baldus study also re-
vealed how prosecutors sought the death penalty 70% of the time in cases
involving an African-American defendant and a Caucasian victim, and in
only 19% of cases where there was a White defendant and a Black
victim.246
In short, the data in studies such as those cited in the Baldus study
cannot prove definitively that racial discrimination is systemic to any
given criminal justice system.247  However, such data shows trends and
issues signals that are cause for alarm and scrutiny.  The mere fact that
examples of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, as dis-
cussed above, exist, means that racial discrimination can and does happen
in the criminal courts, giving cause to examine the matter and attempt to
devise solutions that will prevent recurrences.
V. POTENTIAL DOMESTIC-BASED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
A. Embrace the Jury and its Imperfections
One suggested approach to mitigating the effects of racial discrimina-
tion in the American criminal justice system is to address the issue
through the very aspect of the system that defines it: the jury.248  Rather
than seeking to find the utopian color-blind justice system, complete with
its utopian color-blind jury, this approach acknowledges the racial bias
that exists amongst people of different races, and puts this fact to use in
an attempt to even out the effects of racial bias through the proposal of
reforming the jury process by seating a racially mixed jury for every case,
245. Id.
246. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.  Additional studies also point to the existence of
racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 235
(citing his study of the Duval County Jail, and of the criminal justice system overall, the
author finds that the system disproportionately concentrates on African-Americans who
have been charged with minor offenses); Allan Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law’s
Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662–64 (1987) (noting several statistical analyses comparing
Blacks and Whites in terms of unemployment, poverty level, murder-victim rates, and in-
fant death rates).  However, as the Court Stated in McCleskey, the data in the study of-
fered by the petitioner did not prove that racial discrimination occurred in his case, nor
could it do so in any other case. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287–89 (stating that the mod-
els used by Baldus use a statistical analysis that attempts to account for the independent
variables that would exist in any given case).
247. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 289 (noting that the Court assumed the validity of the
Baldus study in its analysis of McCleskey’s claim that his Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated, but still ruled against him).
248. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury
De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 802–03
(1994).
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regardless of the race of the defendant.249  For example, in Britain, after
two decades in which defense attorneys were requesting that the court
provide a means by which a multi-racial jury would be ensured, as a
means of combating the aggressive use of the peremptory strike, a British
judge agreed in 1980 to hold a pool of so-called stand-by jurors, to be
used if necessary to create a racially mixed jury.250  These potential jurors
would be neither selected for the jury nor excused from it at the outset.251
This approach lasted only nine years because, in 1989, a British Court of
Appeal ruled that trial judges do not have the authority to set the compo-
sition of a jury.252  The rationale of the Court of Appeal was that in Brit-
ain, although peremptory strikes exist and can influence the composition
of a jury, the core of the jury selection process is random process since
voir dire—the standard American jury selection process—is not used.253
As a result, the use of standby jurors by a judge violated the underlying
philosophy of the English jury selection system.254
Other proposals to address racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system through modifying the jury selection process include: allowing mi-
nority defendants a certain number of peremptory strikes of majority ju-
rors, taking affirmative steps to ensure that minorities are not
underrepresented in the venire, and using affirmative peremptory choices
to ensure that a defendant’s peers are included on a jury.255  However,
such proposals generally run afoul of existing principles of the current
jury selection process in the United States.  For example, allowing per-
emptory strikes of majority jurors undermines a person’s right not to be
excluded from a jury based on race.256  Presumably proponents of the
249. See generally id. (discussing the history of the jury selection process in the United
States, including the creation of the law to prevent abuses of the use of the peremptory
strike, and arguing that a better alternative to the elimination of the peremptory strike is
the implementation of the proposals contained herein as to reforming the jury selection
process).
250. See id. at 802–03 (identifying that this modification of the jury selection process
enabled attorneys to utilize their peremptory strikes strategically to obtain a mixed jury).
251. Id. at 803.
252. See id. (finding in that same year, a trial judge had upheld the practice of using
stand-by jurors to achieve racially mixed juries).
253. Ramirez, supra note 248, at 803.
254. See id. at 803–04 (commenting that, in 1994, courts in Hennepin County, Minne-
sota were debating whether they should require that every twenty-three member grand
jury contain at least two minority members, or 8.7% of the total jury, as a result of the fact
that 9% of the adult population was made up of minorities.)
255. See id. at 804–17 (providing that such proposals, under existing jury selection
principles, may be the only chance in a given trial for a minority defendant to ensure that
at least some minority jurors are members of a given jury).
256. See id. at 804 (indicating that allowing such a proposal would amount to protect-
ing the rights of defendants at the expense of jurors’ rights).
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automatic mixed racial jury approach base their views on the assumption
that people from different races will bring their unique experiences as a
member of their race to bear on interpreting facts and assessing the moti-
vations of behaviors.257  And not on an assumption that a member of one
race will favor members of his or her own race, and disfavor members of
other races.258  While such proposals may have merit in a practical sense,
they face many obstacles in becoming realities.259
B. Limit or Eliminate the Death Penalty
Others have proposed either eliminating or placing a moratorium on
the imposition of the death penalty as a means of addressing racial bias in
its administration.260  This approach, while ensuring that the injustice as-
sociated with judges and juries meting out the death penalty based on
racial prejudice will be eliminated, tends to address a problem not by
coming up with a solution, but by removing the practice that is subject to
the problem.  Such an approach loses sight of the issue of whether or not
the death penalty should exist, because injustice to the innocent, or une-
ven administration of the death penalty, are only two factors affecting the
question.
C. Repurpose Existing Law
As is evident from the proposals mentioned above, the problem of ra-
cial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system is not easily solved.
Most studies concentrate on proving its existence rather than eliminating
it.  New use of existing law, and the creation and use of new law have
proven to be, and are still perhaps, the best means by which to address
the problem.  An important example is the federal government’s use of
an existing civil rights law in prosecuting the Mississippi Burning crimes,
as noted above.261  Even though some criminal defendants in that case
were acquitted, at least some measure of justice was achieved, where pre-
viously the states involved had been unable to seat an impartial jury due
257. Id. at 804–17.
258. Ramirez, supra note 248, at 804–17.
259. See id. (stating that such proposals may be criticized as not only failing to guaran-
tee a racially mixed jury, but also as perpetuating stereotypes of races).
260. See generally Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 241 (Saundra D. Westervelt &
John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (recognizing that eliminating the death penalty would miti-
gate other problems as well, such as a general lack of adequate counsel for defendants).
261. See Russell, supra note 232, at 1245 (pointing out that the federal government
prosecuted eighteen individuals in the Mississippi Burning crimes “in a federal civil rights
conspiracy trial”).
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to the problem of racial prejudice.262  The law used required that those
who were convicted receive much lighter sentences than those which
could have been imposed under state murder convictions, this approach
was unsuccessfully in Ebens, but effective in the well-known Rodney
King case.263
Another example is the creation and use of hate crime statutes to pros-
ecute criminals in situations where local prejudice against minorities
stands in the way of justice.  Although this approach still has imperfec-
tions, due to the hurdles that need to be overcome in order to achieve a
conviction,264 these statutes could be revised in order to address their
deficiencies at achieving justice.  Effective prosecution of Ebens for a
state or federal hate crime, especially under revised statutes, could feasi-
bly have led to justice in that case.
The issues of prosecutorial abuses, including wrongful accusation and
wrongful prosecution, could also be addressed through the use of existing
legislation, and through revised legislation to strengthen these laws.  This
approach could have benefited Willie Bennett and Clarence Brandley,
discussed in Part II above.  In discussing legislating away prosecutorial
abuses, the debate would surround the state’s interest in providing
prosecutorial leeway versus the state’s need to protect its citizens from
abuse by the law.  Also, investigative abuses such as those inherent in
both the Bennett and Brandley cases could be pursued more frequently
and vigorously, thus serving as a preventive measure and a means of ex-
tracting justice in such cases of racial discrimination by the U.S. criminal
justice system.
D. Leverage Technology
Finally, the continued evolution of forensic science—mainly the identi-
fication of DNA evidence—and its use in the criminal courts, can assist in
reclaiming justice in the courtroom for racial minorities.  An important
aspect of the use of forensic DNA testing in criminal cases is that it can
262. See id. (elaborating on the fact that the federal government prosecuted eighteen
individuals, but only secured convictions for seven of them).
263. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1425, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the
judgments of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, in
which police officers Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell were convicted of violating victim
Rodney King’s federal civil rights by beating him during an arrest for driving under the
influence of alcohol).
264. See Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal Legislation,
34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 878 (2001) (recognizing that among the problems of current fed-
eral hate crime legislation is that federal jurisdiction does not exist unless a victim has
engaged in one of a group of federally protected activities, and a nexus between the activ-
ity and the crime exists).
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not only exonerate the innocent, wrongfully accused, or wrongfully con-
victed, but it can also lead to the successful prosecution of the correct
suspect.265  Given that minorities are disproportionately affected by in-
vestigatory and prosecutorial abuses based on racial prejudice, the posi-
tive effects of the use of DNA science to correct for these wrongs will
have a disproportionately positive effect on these minority victims of the
criminal justice system.
E. A Look to the Future
The examples and data noted above show that the problem of racial
injustice in the U.S. criminal justice system exists for various reasons, and
points toward the level of its frequency and severity.  In looking no fur-
ther than the daily newspaper, evidence can be found that racial discrimi-
nation in the criminal courts persists.  In April of 2007, a jury found four
White defendants liable in civil court for the savage assault of a mentally
disabled African-American man, Billy Ray Johnson, four years earlier.266
The criminal trials led to convictions on only minor offenses; the most
severe sentence imposed was sixty days in jail.267  The civil verdict was for
$9 million in damages.268  While this case indicates yet another means by
which victims of a racially discriminatory criminal justice system can gain
a measure of justice, i.e., through the use of the civil courts, that is not the
main illustrative point of the case.  The take away from the above situa-
tion is that defendants will often not have the resources to pay the dam-
ages to the plaintiff, and therefore suffer no real consequences for their
actions.269  The case illustrates the gravity of the injustice done to the
victim by the criminal courts.  Here, a helpless African-American man
was severely beaten by four White men, and the East Texas town of Lin-
den could not find a judge and a jury to impose a sentence of more than
thirty to sixty days of jail time.270  Although a positive sign exists in the
fact that the same town provided the civil courtroom and jury (mostly
265. Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 260, at 259 (setting forth the fact that of the first
eighty-two DNA exonerations, DNA testing tied the crime involved to another person
fifteen times, and that the incidence of this happening was likely to increase as databanks
were updated and DNA testing became standard operating procedure).
266. Laura Parker, A Jury’s Stand Against Racism Reflects Hope for Change, USA
TODAY (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-26-
texas-town_N.htm (noting that the civil jury consisted of ten White women, one White man
and one Black man, and that the jury took only four hours to reach its verdict).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. (assuming the defendants would not be able to pay the $9 million because
three of them were recent high school graduates, and the other was a young jailer).
270. Id. (“[Two defendants] pleaded guilty to injury to a disabled person and [were]
sentenced to [thirty] days in jail.  [The remaining two defendants] were convicted of minor
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White) which led to the civil judgment.271 Regardless, justice is still often
elusive to racial minorities.  What would the sentences in the criminal
trial have been if four Black men had been convicted of aggravated as-
sault of a mentally disabled White person in the town of Linden, Texas?
While cases like that of Billy Ray Johnson are still happening, and are
likely to continue for some time, there is hope for the future.  Those
hopes spring from the acknowledgment of the existence of the problem of
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system in the United States, in
examining its gravity, in analyzing its underpinnings, and in using the law
to eliminate it.
VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Jurisdiction and Relevance
Racial discrimination has been barred under international human
rights law since the inception of the human rights movement.  The United
States has been a party to much but not all of the major developments in
evolving international human rights law from the beginnings of this law
until today, starting with the creation of the United Nations in 1945 dur-
ing the aftermath of World War II.272  The current law that protects the
human rights of an individual has evolved from beginings of the U.N. and
its law that governs the responsibility of States for injuries to aliens.273
The substantive rights protected by each of these bodies of law have con-
verged in the decades since World War II,274 leading to a greater overall
charges in separate trials in 2005 and sentenced to [thirty] days and [sixty] days,
respectively.”).
271. Parker, supra note 266.
272. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 268 (6th ed. 2010).
The U.N. is the first international organization with all but universal, world wide mem-
bership, charged with the responsibility for maintaining international peace and secur-
ity, developing friendly relations among nations, achieving international co-operation
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian na-
ture, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Id.
273. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
IN A NUTSHELL 132–33 (3d ed. 2002) (The U.N. Charter and the pledge by U.N. Member
States “laid the conceptual foundation for the development of substantive human rights
law and for making human rights a matter of international concern”).
274. Id. at 140.
Prior to the Second World War, human rights issues were, in general, not regulated by
international law and, therefore, were deemed to be matters within the national juris-
diction of each State.  The manner in which a State treated its own nationals was, with
some exceptions, not a matter of international concern, and hence, an issue that other
420 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:375
protection of the individual from human rights violations of all types, in-
cluding racial discrimination.  The important difference between these
two branches of law is that the law governing State responsibility for inju-
ries to aliens protects rights asserted only by individuals who are not na-
tionals of the offending State, whereas what has become commonly
known as international human rights law protects all individuals against
all such harms by a State, regardless of whether they are nationals of that
State or not.275  The distinction is that under one branch of law the indi-
vidual is the aggrieved party, whereas under another law the complainant
State is the aggrieved party—the State makes the claim of harm and
wrongdoing on behalf of the individual.276
The establishment of the U.N. Charter signified the beginnings of the
protection of the human rights of the individual.277 The charter by which
the U.N. was established contained many human rights provisions that
distinguished it from earlier attempts to preserve and protect human
rights, in that it guaranteed not only certain categories of human beings
and certain types of rights, but instead all human rights for all people,
without distinction as to race, language, religion or gender.278  The U.N.
Charter therefore created two interrelated obligations that served this
purpose, the universal respect for human rights without limitation as
noted above, and a pledge by all Member States to “take joint and sepa-
rate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes” of the human rights delineated under Article 55 of the
U.N. Charter.279  Thus, the U.N. Charter brought about a commitment on
the part of the U.N. itself and of its Member States to promote both
human rights and fundamental freedoms as legally binding obligations.280
In 1948, shortly after the U.N. was created, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) was developed by the Commission of Human
States had no right to address on an international plane.  Today, the manner in which a
State treats its nationals is no longer ipso facto a matter within its national jurisdiction
because such a large body of international law regulates the subject of human rights.
Id. at 140–41.
275. Id. at 129–30.
276. Id. at 129.  The concept of nationality is irrelevant in human rights law because
the individual is deemed to be the subject of these rights.  Nationality is of vital impor-
tance, however, under the law of State responsibility, because here the injury to a national
is deemed to be an injury to the State of nationality. Id. at 129–30.
277. Id. at 132; supra note 42 and accompanying text.
278. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 132–33.
279. U.N. Charter art. 56; BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 132–33.
280. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 133.
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Rights (the Commission).281  The United States was instrumental in de-
veloping the UDHR, as evidenced by the substantial influence of Eleanor
Roosevelt, the chair of the Commission, and her U.S. advisors on the
drafting process.282  The UDHR became the principal instrument per-
forming the protective functions regarding rights and freedoms spoken
of, but not defined, in the U.N. Charter.283  Despite the fact that the
UDHR was a non-binding resolution when adopted, it has since come to
be known as an authoritative interpretation of the rights that the U.N.
and its Member States are obligated to advance under the U.N. Char-
ter.284  Additionally, support exists for the proposition that any State that
pursues a policy targeting race, gender, language, or faith that denies
groups or individuals the rights declared in the UDHR, violates the non-
discrimination principle fundamental to the human rights obligations
adopted by the U.N. Charter.285  The UDHR contains a long list of gen-
eral civil, political, economic, cultural signatories of and social rights, and
supports the notion that the law should only limit these rights and free-
doms in order to protect the rights of others and the general welfare.286
Thus, all States that signed the UDHR have pledged to guarantee those
human rights called for in the declaration and arguably, recognize the
underlying power of the UDHR as customary international law.
Significant subsequent additions to the UDHR include the adoption by
the U.N. General Assembly of the International Convention on the Elim-
ination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1965, which the
281. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18; Peter Bailey, The Crea-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS NETWORK, http://
www.universalrights.net/main/creation.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
282. See Bailey, supra note 281 (mentioning that Eleanor Roosevelt and her advisors
from the U.S. State Department played a substantial role in the creation of the
declaration).
283. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, 133.
284. Id. General support exists for the proposition that some of the rights delineated
in the UDHR, including the right to not be racially discriminated against, have attained the
status of customary international law. Id. at 133–34.  Customary international law is de-
fined as resulting from “a general and consistent practice of States that is followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.” General Principles of International Law: Customary In-
ternational Law, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL MONITOR, http://www.judicialmonitor.org/
archive_1206/generalprinciples.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
285. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 134.
286. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18. BUERGENTHAL & MUR-
PHY, supra note 273, at 134.  The UDHR States:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limi-
tations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 18, at art. 29 ¶2.
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United States ratified in 1994,287 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),288 and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).289  These last two instru-
ments, along with the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol and Second Optional
Protocol, the UDHR, and the U.N. Charter’s human rights provisions,
form the International Bill of Human Rights.290  Although the United
States has ratified the CERD and the ICCPR, it has not become a party
to the ICESCR, and has thus failed to fully endorse the International Bill
of Human Rights.291  Nonetheless, the United States advocates the prin-
ciples of the United Nations and the UDHR, and has been subject to all
of the articles under the ICERD and the ICCPR, for decades.
Among the issues overseen by the constituencies of the U.N. is the
prevention of racial discrimination in all of its forms and venues.292  As a
non-binding resolution, the UDHR provides no direct avenue of relief for
an aggrieved party.  However, given the role of the United States in shap-
ing this important human rights document, the U.S. government can cer-
tainly be said to have an interest in seeing its principles carried out within
the borders it governs, meaning that the United States, in order to be true
to its stated principles in leading the drafting of the UDHR, should also
be leading the way for the world in establishing a society free of racial
discrimination.
Under the ICERD, ICESCR, and the ICCPR an individual citizen of a
member State or a member State itself can bring a human rights com-
plaint, including a complaint regarding racial discrimination, against an-
other member State and be heard.293  Such a complaint can be about
racial discrimination, or other human rights violations.294  This mecha-
287. ACLU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (N.D.), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
pdfs/humanrights/cerd_faqs.pdf.
288. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 18.
289. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18.
290. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 135.  The Second Optional Proto-
col advocates an abolition of the death penalty.  Id.
291. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
292. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 18; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18. See Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, supra note 18 (stating that every person is entitled to equal protec-
tion of laws without being subjected to discrimination).
293. Human Rights Bodies – Complaint Procedures, OFF. OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.
htm#communcications (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (describing the process for individual and
State-to-State human rights complaints).
294. Id.
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nism of seeking justice through international law is significant, as it pro-
vides a mechanism for relief of aggrieved parties beyond those provided
in domestic courts.
As a result of its membership in the United Nations, the United States
is subject to the regulatory mechanisms created by the U.N.  Among
these mechanisms are general human rights procedures that are based on
the UDHR and general human rights law.295  In 1946, the Commission on
Human Rights was established under the U.N. Charter as a result of po-
litical pressure by forty-two United States non-governmental organiza-
tions.296  The Committee not only performed its general procedure
function, but also served as an expert body to function as the interpreter
of States’ compliance with the ICCPR.297  The Commission on Human
Rights was eventually abolished in favor of the Human Rights Council
(HRC) in 2006.298
The Economic and Social Council also established a public complaint
procedure in 1967 under Resolution 1235.299  This resolution authorized
the Human Rights Commission, now the HRC, to study situations that
show a consistent pattern of human rights violations and issue a report.300
Among the human rights violations specially delineated to be dealt with
under the 1235 procedure is racial discrimination.301  In addition, when
the U.N. General Assembly created the HRC it directed that its main
purpose was to address situations entailing human rights violations, in-
cluding racial discrimination, and to make recommendations on them.302
295. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456 (explaining that even if a State has not
ratified any treaties, it is still subject to U.N. human rights procedures if it is a party to the
U.N. Charter).
296. U.N. Charter art. 68 (“The Economic and Social Council shall set up commis-
sions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.”); United Nations:
Human Rights Documentation, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/spechr.htm
(last upload Oct. 23, 2011).  The body as established “by Economic and Social Council
resolution 5 (I) of 16 February 1946.” Id.  Bailey, supra note 281.
297. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 137–38.
298. United Nations: Human Rights Documentation, supra note 296.  “The Commis-
sion on Human Rights concluded its 62nd and final session on 27 March 2006; its work is
continued by the Human Rights Council.” Id.
299. Economic and Social Council Res. E/4393, Official Records, May 8-June 6, 1967,
U.N. GAOR 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, E/RES/1235(XLII), at 17 (June 6, 1967) (authorizing
the Human Rights Commission to investigate any information it receives on flagrant
human rights violations).
300. Id. at 17–18 (allowing the Human Rights Commission to produce studies of
human rights violations it has examined).
301. Id. (including racial discrimination among violations of human rights).
302. The Human Rights Council, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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These public procedures are buttressed by the enforcement of human
rights under a private complaint procedure established by U.N. Resolu-
tion 1503, known commonly as the 1503 procedure.303  This complaint
procedure, carried out by the HRC, is a procedure that was established to
address “consistent pattern[s] of gross violations.”304  Thus, the HRC can
address cases under its complaint procedure that involve racial discrimi-
nation by a member-State.  The newly-designed complaint procedure is
meant to be an improvement on the 1503 complaint procedure used by
the Commission on Human Rights from 1973 to 2005.305
Another important U.N. process is the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR).306  The Universal Periodic Review was established to review the
human rights record of the 192 U.N. Member States every four years.307
The UPR, a State-driven process, is administered by the Human Rights
Council to ensure the improvement of human rights situation within each
individual country.308  As one of the main charters of the HRC, the UPR
has been designed to ensure equal treatment of every country reviewed
during the process when their human rights records and situations are
assessed.309  Racial discrimination is one of the issues addressed in these
reviews, both in general and specifically with regard to a member-State’s
criminal justice system.310
In addition to these U.N.-based mechanisms and treaty bodies, other
regulatory schemes have been created to enable nations and individuals
303. Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure, supra note 293 ( ECOSOC Res.
1503(XLVIII) was adopted on May 27, 1970); O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 457
(asserting the U.N. Resolution established the 1503 procedure as a private procedure).
304. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at Id. at 456 (explaining that individual
human rights violations may be submitted to the Sub-Committee if domestic remedies
have been exhausted and they are part of a larger gross violation).
305. MEGHAN ABRAHAM, A NEW CHAPTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK ON
ISSUES OF TRANSITION FROM THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL 67 (Eleonore Dziurzynski ed., 2006), available at http://olddoc.ishr.ch/
handbook/Chpt5.pdf (stating complaint procedures have developed considerably since the
1970s when the 1503 complaint procedure was implemented); Human Rights Council Com-
plaint Procedure, supra note 293.
306. G.A. Res. 61/251, ¶ 5e, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/251 (Apr. 3, 2006).  For a more
detailed discussion of Universal Periodic Review see infra Part VI.E.ii.
307. Universal Periodic Review, OFFICE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://
www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, Note by the Secretary-General, Provision Agenda and Annotations, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/76/1 (Jan. 11, 2010) (lisiting the Universal Review as a topic of interest for an
uncoming committee meeting).
2011] INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 425
to police the enforcement of international human rights law.311  Among
these mechanisms are the ability to bring a complaint in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ),312 and the ability to bring a charge in the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).313  The ICC was created in 1998 for the pur-
pose of hearing cases involving crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes, and this is still the case today.314
Each of the mechanisms and venues that govern racial discrimination
has its own unique possibilities and limitations; however, all provide a
level of hope for positive change.  Which mechanism provides the best
relief to the problem of racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice
system?  An examination of each of them provides some illumination.
B. The Treaty Bodies: ICERD, ICCPR, and ICESCR
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (ICERD) was adopted by the U.N. General Assem-
bly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.315  The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted in 1966 and entered
into force in 1976.316  The International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted in 1966 and entered into
force in 1976.317  Since the United States has not ratified the ICESCR,
doubts regarding the sincerity of the United States to guarantee these
rights for its citizens have been raised.318  Prominent among the rights
which the United States failed to guarantee to protect is that of the right
of each of its citizens to live a life free of racial discrimination within the
spheres of the ICESCR.319
311. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 142–43 (stating prior to Protocol
No. 11 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervised the States’ compli-
ance with human rights laws).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 98–100.
314. ICC at a glance, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
315. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 18.
316. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 18.
317. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 18.
318. See id. (guaranteeing a multitude of human rights within the economic, cultural,
and social spheres).
319. See id. at art. 2 (enumerating a number of economic, social, and cultural rights
that nations should afford their citizenry without regard for race or color).  This treaty
recognizes that in order to protect the inalienable rights granted under the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the citizens of Member States must live in an environment that
allows them to pursue their economic, social, and cultural needs without restrictions on the
basis of a label placed on them by society. Id. at pmbl., art. 2.  Only without such restric-
tions will each citizen have the ability to pursue their freedom from fear and want. Id.
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At first glance the treaty bodies offer hope in the search for an effec-
tive solution to the problem of racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal
justice system not provided by U.S. law.  While the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination against citizens on the basis of race in a
comprehensive list of areas, it has never been enforceable against the
U.S. federal government.320  In addition, while the Act prohibits policies
that result in a discriminatory impact on minorities, even in cases where
no discriminatory intent exists, in the 2001 case of Alexander v. Sando-
val,321 the U.S. Supreme Court held that such discriminatory impact
claims could not be brought in a court of law specifically to enforce Title
VI of the Act, which prohibits discrimination in government-funded ac-
tivities and programs, thus diluting the disriminatory impact argument in
this realm.322  Instead, such claims could only be pursued
administratively.323
This decision further dilutes the ability to use statistical studies in pur-
suit of discrimination claims against the United States and its states, just
as the previously cited case of McCleskey v. Kemp does.324  However, the
ICERD prohibits Member States from having policies that result in a dis-
criminatory impact on minorities even without intent.325  This means that
the use of statistical data is allowed in alleging and attempting to prove
discrimination in an institution such as the U.S. criminal justice system.
The challenge in using the ICERD in this way to bring about positive
change in the U.S. criminal justice system would be in finding effective
means of enforcing it, as discussed below.
Given that the United States is a party to both the ICERD and the
ICCPR treaties, a citizen of the United States or another country should
be able to raise a complaint of racial discrimination against the United
States, using the individual complaint procedure outlined in each treaty,
and that complaint could specifically relate to racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system.326  However, despite ratification of these treaties
by the United States, it ensured that it would not be the subject of an
320. U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK & HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME, THE CERD
TREATY AND U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 1 (2011), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/
sites/default/files/The_CERD_Treaty_and_US_Civil_Rights_Law_June_2011.pdf (pre-
pared for the CERD Task Force of  the U.S. Human Rights Network, and the CERD
Subcommitte of the Human Rights at Home Campaign).
321. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
322. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
323. Id.
324. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987).
325. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 18, at art 6.
326. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 18, at art. 14; see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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individual complaint by a citizen of any nation—including its own citi-
zens—by not agreeing to the individual complaint procedure contained in
either treaty.327  This fact casts more doubt on the sincerity of the United
States in protecting the citizens of the world from acts in violation of their
human rights, perpetrated by the United States.
However, the fact that the United States has ratified and joined both
the ICERD and the ICCPR means that where a citizen of another Mem-
ber State has been victimized by racial discrimination by the United
States, including within its criminal justice system, the Member State
where the aggrieved party is domiciled can bring a complaint on behalf of
that citizen to the U.N. under these treaties.328  The investigative and rul-
ing body responsible for such cases is the U.N. Human Rights Council.329
Given how far international human rights law has evolved since the
end of World War II, such a complaint is viewed as a legitimate expres-
sion of concern about alleged violations of internationally accepted and
recognized human rights not seen as an intrusion into sovereign affairs.330
In addition, while the filing of a complaint on behalf of an individual citi-
zen against another nation would amount to providing another layer of
potential judicial relief for that citizen beyond the due process already
existing in the State of citizenship, the filing of a complaint of systematic
violations of human rights by one State against another would potentially
have much greater, far reaching effects on the accused State by possibly
leading to an adjudication that the offending State implement changes to
its systems as a remedy for the problem.  However, to date not a single
complaint has ever been raised by one Member State against another
with regard to a violation of the human rights of an individual or as a
systematic practice.331  For whatever reason—be it fear of repercussion or
not wanting to risk jeopardizing diplomatic relations with an important
trade partner—no State has ever filed a complaint against another State.
Thus, this available mechanism for instituting positive change in the ad-
supra note 18 (outlining the procedure through which a complaint may be brought to the
attention of the appropriate committee by either a member-State or an individual citizen).
327. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion supra note 18, at art. 14; see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 18 (demonstrating the reservations the United States listed to various compo-
nents in the treaty, including refusing to adopt the applicable complaint procedures for
individual citizens).
328. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 137, 141.
329. The Human Rights Council, supra note 302.
330. See BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 137, 141 (discussing how the
way that governments handle their own citizenry has become a matter of international
concern, rather than simply an internal issue not subject to outside review).
331. Hao Duy Phan, A Blueprint For A Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, 10
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 384, 403 (2009).
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ministration of criminal justice in the United States will most certainly
never be used.
As no viable mechanism for redress of racial injustice by the U.S. crim-
inal justice system exists under these human rights treaties, is there any
way in which the treaties can be used to hold the United States accounta-
ble and affect positive change?  One possible recourse that may provide
some hope for the future would be the requirement that each State Party
submit periodic reports on its own record of performance to the treaty
terms.332  While each State upon ratification may or may not have noted
reservations to any given treaty’s provisions or have declared specific
terms for ratification, a process of self-evaluation does exist as an obliga-
tion of a State Party to the treaties.333  As an example, Article 40 of the
ICCPR requires that each State submits a report every five years that
defines the measures it has taken to protect the rights recognized by the
covenant and on any progress that has been made in the exercise of those
rights by its citizenry.334  These reports are examined by the Human
Rights Council in public meetings by dialogue with the representatives of
the State being reviewed.335  These meetings take place with relevant
agencies and U.N. bodies in attendance and are designed to be construc-
tive in nature, with ample time for discussion of factors related to imple-
mentation priorities and future goals.336  Although only U.N. and State
Party representatives may engage in the official dialogue of the process,
various human rights advocates, such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), can review the State reports and issue what is known as a
shadow report or an alternative report, which present their own version
of the reality of a situation.337
Shadow reports can play an important part in the review process of a
State’s self-evaluation report by providing the U.N.-reviewing body with
an independent tool by which to assess a government’s accountability for
any violations of the rights protected in a particular treaty and to exert
political pressure on those governments through exposure of any viola-
tions.338  The NGOs which issue these reports, and which often conduct
332. JULIE A. MERTUS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GUIDE FOR A
NEW ERA 100 (2d ed. 2009).
333. Id.
334. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18;
MERTUS, supra note 332, at 100.
335. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18,
at art. 40 ¶¶ 2–4; MERTUS, supra note 332, at 100 (exchanging dialogue with the represen-
tative of the State being reviewed).
336. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 18,
at art. 40 ¶¶ 2–4; MERTUS, supra note 332, at 67.
337. MERTUS, supra note 332, at 68.
338. Id.
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investigations of certain situations of alleged human rights violations, can
hold in-depth knowledge of these situations that can be extremely valua-
ble for reviewing bodies, especially if the NGO is based in the State
under review.339  Shadow reports by NGOs can also help inform the gen-
eral public directly on various human rights violations that are taking
place in a given State, leading to possible influence on that State’s public
policy and laws.340  In the case of a specific issue, such as racial discrimi-
nation in a State’s criminal justice system, an NGO shadow report, while
not generally focused on every human right covered in a particular treaty,
can be focus in on a problematic area requiring special attention.341
These review sessions conclude with the reviewing body’s observations
and recommendations to the State Party and, in some cases, follow-up
procedures exist to help bring about compliance with a particular
treaty.342  The ICCPR, for example, has such a follow-up procedure.343
After the concluding observations of a review have been presented, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) assists
with the follow-up procedures, which have take the shape of a regional
meeting with Member States.344  However, due to the lack of resources
and the questions regarding the procedure’s effectiveness, these follow-
up procedures are not in place for every human rights treaty.345  None-
theless, the treaty reporting process is an integral part of every “human
rights treaty review system.”346  On the surface, the reporting process can
provide impetus for change to have an effect on the domestic level.347
This process generates opportunities for governments, individuals, and
NGOs to engage in constructive dialogue regarding “national priorities,
successes, best practices, and challenges in meeting national convention
obligations.”348
339. Id.
340. Id. at 69.
341. Id.
342. MERTUS, supra note 332, at 69.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 71.
347. MERTUS, supra note 332, at 71.
348. Id. An important parallel should be drawn between domestic court challenges
and those that take place on the international level, in particular, human rights challenges.
Id. at 76.  Just as is the case in the United States appellate system, wherein the U.S. Su-
preme Court generally only considers a case if all other domestic remedies have been pur-
sued and decided upon, international human rights courts and other powerful national
considerations have done the same in recent years. Id. The only exceptions to this require-
ment are cases where domestic court challenges have been unreasonably prolonged or are
unlikely to lead to effective relief. Id. Other typical requirements are that a case cannot be
considered if it is already under consideration by another international jurisdiction; if it is
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C. Procedure of Inquiry
If the above mechanisms fail or prove inviable, one other mechanism
exists which may provide relief to a complainant: a procedure of in-
quiry.349  Under this procedure, if a particular human rights committee is
given information about “‘grave and systematic violations’” of a particu-
lar treaty by a State Party, that committee is empowered to seek a re-
sponse from the State Party in question.350  This procedure may lead to
further inquiry by committee members, including an investigation and
concluding with a report containing recommendations and comments.351
After receipt of this report, the State Party is given the opportunity to
respond within a six-month time-frame.  One differential as to this proce-
dure and the others discussed is that the findings and other communica-
tions throughout the course of the procedure are entirely closed and
confidential and thus are not made public.352  Some of these procedures
have follow-up mechanisms that enhance the possibility of compliance by
States in general.353
Other relevant influential factors in claims of human rights violations
under treaty law are general comments,354 thematic discussions,355 and
national plans of action.356  General comments are published interpreta-
tions of content in human rights provisions contained in treaties.357
These comments serve as recommendations that can provide guidance to
State Parties in reaction to their self-monitoring reports, while at the
same time influencing the development of human rights treaty obligations
in general.358  Thematic discussions are meetings among U.N. specialized
agencies, NGOs, and other organizations that are either held on a regular
basis to address general development of human rights norms or called to
specifically address a particular topic of concern.359  National plans of ac-
tion are those steps that a State Party develops to enable the implementa-
tion of treaty commitments.360  Such plans can be effective instruments
not only in enabling a State Party to carry out its obligations, but also in
filed anonymously; and, of course, if it is filed by a person or persons not under the juris-
diction of a “State that is a party to the Optional Protocol.” Id.
349. Id. at 77.
350. Id. at 76.
351. Id.
352. MERTUS, supra note 332, at 77.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 78.
356. Id. at 79.
357. MERTUS, supra note 332, at 77.
358. Id. at 77–78.
359. Id. at 78.
360. Id. at 79.
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help monitoring organizations to assess the degree of compliance with a
particular treaty.361  Thus, the general comment, the thematic discussion,
and the national plan of action could all be used to help the United States
address the complex issue of racial discrimination in its criminal justice
system.
D. Regional Human Rights Law Systems and the Inter-American
System
Three main regional human rights law systems currently exist in the
world: the European System, the African System, and the Inter-Ameri-
can System.362  Each was created by its own council or charter, and is
governed by a treaty.363  The European System is the oldest of the three,
dating back to the drafting by the Council of Europe in 1950 of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which entered into force in 1953.364  Beginning in 1981, the
African system is the newest.  The Organization of African Unity, known
now as the African Union, adopted the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights, which entered into force in 1986.365  Each system has
jurisdiction over only those States which are parties to their associated
treaties and individuals who are nationals of these States.366  Each has its
own court of human rights that hears claims made by individuals against
361. Id.
362. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 141, 145, 151.
363. See generally id. at 143, 147-48, 152 (describing the general background of each of
the three systems).  The European system is governed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. at 141.  The Inter-American
system is governed by both the Charter of the Organization of American States and the
American Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 145.  The African system is governed by
the African Charter. Id. at 151.
364. Id. at 141.  For the full text of Protocol Nos. 11 & 14 see ETS no. 005-Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/html/005.htm (last visitied Oct. 23, 2011).
365. Id. at 151.  For the full text of the Charter see African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, http://
www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
366. Id. at 143, 147–48, 152.  “A State that now ratifies the European Convention
accepts the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases referred to it directly by individuals and other
States [sic] parties to the Convention.” Id. at 143.  Once a State has ratified the American
Convention, the Inter-American Commission has jurisdiction over petitions directed
against that State. Id. at 147–48.  The African Charter creates and gives power to an Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to respond to inter-State and individual
petitions.  Id. at 152.  The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in
1998 and put into force in 2004. Institutional Background, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.african-court.org/en/court/about-the-court/institutional-
background/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
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States and States against States.367  The Inter-American System is the
combination of two systems with separate origins.  One is based on the
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) of 1948, which
has its roots in the OAS Charter and developed into the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.368  The other organization is based on the
American Convention on Human Rights, which was drafted in 1969 and
entered into force in 1978.369
Only one of the three main regional human rights systems could poten-
tially have jurisdiction over the United States370  When the OAS Charter
was amended in 1970 to make the Inter-American Commission an OAS
charter organ, the constitutional and legal powers of the Commission
strengthened, leading to the obligation on every Member State’s part to
promote all human rights stipulated in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.371  The power to ensure this obligation is com-
plied with is held by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and the OAS General Assembly.372  In discharging this obligation, the
Commission accepts individual communications, undertakes on-site in-
vestigations, and prepares country studies.373  These reports are pub-
lished and reviewed by the political organs of the OAS hoping they will
have an impact on the improvement of the conditions reported in the
States under scrutiny.374  Under this process, the United States, as a
member of the OAS, could be investigated for human rights violations
such as racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, potentially
providing relief in the form of positive change just through public
exposure.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights not only hears
cases under the jurisdiction established by its authority under the OAS
Charter, but also under authority established by the American Conven-
367. See generally BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 142–43, 147–48, 152
(describing the general background and jurisdictional powers of each system).
368. What is IACHR?, INT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cidh.oas.org/
what.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
369. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 145–46; What is the IACHR, supra
note 362.
370. See BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 151 (explaining that the
United States is not bound by the Inter-American Court’s decision because it has not rati-
fied the American Convention).  Each system under the Inter-American System has its
own judicial institution, with its own unique jurisdiction implications. Id. at 151.
371. Id. at 145–46; What is the IACHR?, supra note 368.
372. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 146.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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tion on Human Rights.375  The American Convention has been ratified
by twenty-five of the thirty-five OAS Member States.376  Among those
that have not ratified it is the United States.377  Once again, this raises
doubt as to the sincerity of the United States to rigorously pursue the
protection of the human rights of its citizens and other citizens of the
world.
To adjudicate claims, the American Convention uses both the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, which was established under
the OAS Charter and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.378
The principle function of the Inter-American Commission under the
American Convention is to deal with claims of violations of rights that
the treaty guarantees.379  In a move unique among human rights treaties,
the American Convetion mandates that individual petitions be heard
against Member States, while State-versus-State petitions are optional.380
Therefore, once a State has ratified the American Convention, the new
State has accepted the jurisdiction of the American Commission to hear
claims of violations of human rights directed against that State by individ-
uals.381  However, a State may not file a complaint against another State
under the American Convention unless both States have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission to hear claims by States
against States.382  Since the United States has not ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights, it escapes judgment as to racial discrimi-
nation in its criminal justice system along with other issues examined by
the Inter-American Commission.
375. Id. at 145, 147 (describing the hierarchy of the OAS establishing the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights and the American Convention establishing both the
International Commission of Human Rights and an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights); What is the IACHR?, supra note 368.
376. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 146.  Among the other Member
States that have not ratified the American Convention, in addition to the United States,
are Canada and Cuba. Id.
377. Id. at 146, 151.  The decisions of the Inter-American Court “are potentially bind-
ing on member States.” Id. at 151.  However, the fact that the United States has not joined
the American Convention excludes it from being bound by such decisions. Id.
378. Id. at 145, 147.  Both, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, consist of seven members. Id.  The members of
the Inter-American Commission on Human rights are elected by the OAS General Assem-
bly, whereas the members of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are elected by
the States that are parties to the Convention. Id.
379. Id. at 145, 147; What is the IACHR?, supra note 368.
380. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 147.
381. Id. at 147–48.
382. Id. at 148.  In addition to meeting certain criteria, such as stating a prima facie
case, all national remedies must be exhausted before a compliant can be admitted to the
Commission. Id. at 149.
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The Inter-American Court also has the power to hear cases involving
charges against a State Party to the American Convention.383  This power
is accrued to the Inter-American Court under its contentious jurisdiction,
but this jurisdiction is optional for all State Parties.384  Therefore, this
jurisdiction must be specifically accepted by the State Parties involved
before they can file cases or be subject to cases filed against them.385  A
major difference between the jurisdictions of the Inter-American Com-
mission and the Inter-American Court is that individuals do not have
standing to file cases on their own behalf before the Inter-American
Court, whereas they can do so before the Inter-American Commission.386
Only State Parties and the Inter-American Commission itself may bring
cases before the Inter-American Court.387  Before a case is admissable to
the Court, all available domestic remedies must have been exhausted,
and the Court may only deal with a case under its contentious jurisdiction
if Commission proceedings in the case have run their course.388  How-
ever, once a case has been referred to the Inter-American Court by either
a State Party or the Inter-American Commission on behalf of an individ-
ual, that individual may argue his or her case before the Court without
having to rely on a State Party or the Commission to represent him or her
in the proceeding.389
Judgments of the Inter-American Court are not only final but also
binding on the parties involved.390  In addition, the Court has the power
to enter preliminary injunctions, render declaratory decrees, and award
damages.391  These forms of redress provide additional hope for justice
383. Id. at 148.
384. Id.
385. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 148.
386. Id. After a case is admitted to the Commission, the Commission is in charge of
investigating the facts and attempting to have the parties reach a friendly settlement. Id. at
149.  The Commission then prepares a report for the parties; if in three months the parties
do not reach an agreement, the case will be either referred to the Court or the Commission
will make a final determination that will be binding on he parties.  Id.
387. Id.  Individuals lack standing, and therefore, are prohibited from bringing a case
before the Inter-American Court. Id. However, a 2001 amendment to the Inter-American
Court’s Rules of Procedure “gives individuals the right to argue their cases in the [c]ourt
once the case has been referred to it.” Id.
388. Id. at 150. See In re Viviana Gallardo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, 1427
(Nov. 3, 1981) (hoping to “facilitate the speedy consideration of this case,” the Costa Rican
government waived the requirement to exhaust all domestic options).  It was determined
that while the complaint fulfilled the requirements for the exercise of the court’s jurisdic-
tion, since it had not yet been handled by the Commission, it could not be admitted. Id. at
1430.
389. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 148.
390. Id. at 150.
391. Id.
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on the part of an individual who has been victimized by human rights
violations of a State Party.  But in the case of an issue like racial discrimi-
nation in the U.S. criminal justice system, no relief is available to the
injured party through the Inter-American Court’s contentious jurisdic-
tion, thereby highlighting the failure of the United States to be a party of
a significant advancement in the enforcement of human rights obligations
within its borders.
The Inter-American Court also has advisory jurisdiction, which gives it
authorization to render opinions that interpret the American Convention
and other human rights treaties in the Inter-American system.392  This
advisory jurisdiction can be invoked by all member States of the OAS,
regardless of whether they have ratified the American Convention or any
other treaty, when attempting to address human rights violations on be-
half of their citizens.393  Thus, this could be an important available tool in
enabling both States and individuals to seek to gain a nonbinding ruling
on charges of human rights violations, which would at least bring the is-
sues involved before the world.  Theoretically, even the United States
would be subject to this advisory power of the Inter-American Court.
Such exposure can possibly have an effect on gaining redress or cor-
recting a situation due to political concerns and pressures.
A significant test of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American human
rights system over the United States took place in 2001,394 and it illumi-
nates the question of the power of the Inter-American Commission to
effect change in the U.S. criminal justice system through the exercise of
influence.  In the case of Juan Raul Garza, a U.S. citizen on death row in
Texas, several human rights advocates petitioned the Commission on
Garza’s behalf to commute his death sentence.395  The petitioners
claimed that by allowing into evidence the fact that Garza was a suspect
in four yet-to-be-adjudicated cases in Mexico during the sentencing phase
of his U.S. murder trial, and by subsequently sentencing Garza to death,
392. Id. at 148.
393. Id.  The advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court is “more extensive
than the advisory jurisdiction of any international tribunal in existence today.” Id.
394. See BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra note 273, at 150  (referring to Garza v.
United States, a case involving a “U.S. national on death row in Texas [who] filed a petition
with the Commission seeking a decision that the introduction of certain evidence during
his sentencing violated his rights to life, equal protection and due process”).
395. Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/01,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 1-2 (2001).  The petition indicates that Mr. Garza was
“was tried and convicted by a jury in the United States District Court, Southern District of
Texas, under U.S. federal law on three counts of killing in the furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise, among other offenses, and sentenced by the same jury to death.” Id. at
¶ 24.  However, “Mr. Garza does not challenge these convictions, but rather takes issue
with the punishment that he has received for these crimes.” Id.
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas vio-
lated Garza’s human rights to life, due process, a fair trial, and equal pro-
tection of the law under Articles I, II, XVIII, and XXVI of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.396  The Commission found
the case to be admissible under its jurisdiction because Garza had ex-
hausted all domestic remedies.397
The Commission ultimately found the United States responsible for vi-
olating Garza’s human rights under Articles I, XVIII, and XXVI.  The
United States was recommended to commute his death sentence, and “re-
view its laws, procedures and practices to ensure that persons who are
accused of capital crimes are tried and sentenced in accordance with the
rights under the American Declaration, including in particular prohibit-
ing the introduction of evidence of non-adjudicated crimes during the
sentencing phase of capital trials.”398  In a subsequent proceeding in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Garza argued that the
determination of the Commission was binding on the United States be-
cause it was a party to the treaty creating the Inter-American Commis-
sion.399  The court held that although the United States signed the
American Convention that created the Inter-American Commission, the
signing “d[id] not create private rights enforceable in domestic courts”
for U.S. citizens, and the Commission only had authority to make non-
binding recommendations to the United States, given that the United
States never ratified the treaty.400  Therefore, the court held that under
U.S. law Garza “has not presented any substantial ground on which relief
396. Garza at ¶¶ 2, 24 (2001). See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, Ninth International Conference of American States, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, article
I.
Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.  All
persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this
Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor . . .
Every person has the right to be recognized everywhere as a person having rights and
obligations, and to enjoy the basic civil right . . . Every accused person is presumed to
be innocent until proved guilty.  Every person accused of an offense has the right to be
given an impartial and public hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established
in accordance with pre-existing laws, and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual
punishment.
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man , supra at art. I, II, XVIII, XXVI.
397. Garza at ¶¶ 3, 20 (2001). See Garza v. United States, 528 U.S. 1006 (1999) (de-
nying “[p]etition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit”); United States v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312, 315 (1999) (denying certificate of
appealability).
398. Garza at ¶ 3.
399. Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 918 (7th Cir. 2001).
400. Lappin, 253 F.3d at 924.  Garza argues the United States was bound by the Inter-
American report. Id.  However, Justice Wood notes that “[b]y their very nature, non-bind-
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could be granted in his habeas corpus petition,” thus denying the re-
quested stay of execution.401  Perhaps to further cement the lack of au-
thority of the Inter-American system of human rights and the
Organization of American States over the United States, the court fur-
ther stated that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man was an “aspirational document,” that “did not on its own create any
enforceable obligations on the part of any of the OAS [M]ember
[N]ations.”402  Thus, by not ratifying the American Convention the
United States avoided the intrusion of international law into its domestic
affairs, and it also made clear that it was not ready to be influenced by the
advisory authority of the Inter-American Commission of the Organiza-
tion of American States.
E. U.N.-Charter-Based Mechanisms
All State Parties to the U.N. Charter are subject to general human
rights procedures based on general human rights law and the provisions
of the UDHR.403  These procedures are carried out by the forty-seven
Member States of the Human Rights Council.404  The individuals who sit
on the Council in representation of their States are diplomats, and these
HRC proceedings are highly politicized.405  In the face of this drawback,
the Council can theoretically take a variety of actions in cases brought
before it, including passing resolutions highlighting the degree of concern
about certain human rights violations and appointing a special rapporteur
to further investigate potential human rights violations occurring in a
ing recommendations to a government on how to conduct its affairs would appear to be
addressed to the executive and legislative branches, not to the courts.” Id. at 926.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 925.
More recently, the OAS has developed an American Convention on Human Rights,
which creates an Inter-American Court of Human rights.  Under the American Con-
vention, the Inter-American Court’s decisions are potentially binding on member na-
tions.  The rub is this: although the United States has signed the American
Convention, it has not ratified it, and so that document does not yet qualify as one of
the “treaties” of the United States that creates binding obligations.
Id.
403. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456.  “Until recently, those provisions
were established and carried out by the Commission on Human Rights, but in 2006 the
Commission was replaced by the Human Rights Council, composed of 47 States elected by
regional blocs.” Id. The Council consists of diplomats who meet at least three times a
year, and who subject themselves to Universal Periodic Review, a self-regulating process
that examines the human rights records of each council member. Id.
404. See id. (explaining that all forty-seven members to the U.N. charter can be the
subject of the general U.N. human rights procedure based on general human rights law and
the provisions of the Universal Declaration).
405. Id.
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country.406  For a case to be heard by the Human Rights Council under
general U.N. procedures, the charges must entail “consistent patterns of
gross violations.”407  The U.N.’s HRC does not consider cases alleging
single incidents of human rights violations.408  Thus, an individual who
believes he or she has suffered human rights violations related to racial
discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system would have no recourse
under general U.N. procedures governing human rights.  However, a
State could theoretically charge the United States with systematic gross
violations of human rights with respect to the administration of justice in
the U.S. criminal justice system.  Given the diplomatic composition of the
HRC and the highly politicized nature of its general proceedings, such a
charge is extremely unlikely.  Thus, general U.N. procedures are not a
viable avenue to a solution to the problem of racial discrimination in the
U.S. criminal justice system.
i. Procedueral Remedies
The 1235 procedure established by the Economic and Social Council
has similar characteristics and drawbacks as the U.N. general procedures
outlined above.  As a public procedure conducted by the HRC, this
mechanism for addressing human rights violations in the criminal justice
system of the United States would entail the extremely unlikely event of
a nation bringing a charge against the United States of racial discrimina-
tion.  Realistically speaking, what nation would want to bring scrutiny
unto itself by risking a retaliatory action under the 1235 procedure by the
United States or another State?  In the forty-four years since the estab-
lishment of the procedure, the United States has never been subjected to
a charge under the 1235 procedure.409
In addition to the public procedures, a private procedure known as the
1503 procedure is available to injured parties.410  Under the 1503 proce-
dure, charges of individual human rights violations may be submitted to
the HRC, provided the charges are part of a pattern of gross violations
that are similar in nature to the individual violations charged.411  In addi-
tion, injured parties must have exhausted all domestic remedies in order
406. See id. at 456–57 (“One of the most useful innovation of the U.N. system has
been the creation of ‘thematic’ rapporteurs or working groups who focus on specific viola-
tions or human rights problems, rather than countries.”).
407. Id. at 456.
408. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456.
409. ABRAHAM, supra note 305.
410. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 457. (indicating the availability of a private
procedure for injured parties); supra notes 303–05 and accompanying text.
411. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 457.
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to be eligible to submit their cases to the HRC.412  As part of the proce-
dure, once a case is found to have merit, a private process takes place in
an effort to remedy the violations charged.413  While this process could
theoretically induce the United States to make changes in its criminal
justice system, the result is unlikely until the United States shows an indi-
cation that it is open to the influence of other State Parties.  Although the
procedure’s confidentiality makes it difficult to obtain definitive data on
the number of times States have been subjected to it, a review of availa-
ble public information on the 1503 procedure, which is largely composed
of academic commentaries and Human Rights Watch reports, indicates
that the United States has only been subject to a 1503 procedure once, in
1997, and that this particular case was discontinued by the Human Rights
Commission before its consideration was completed.414
ii. Universal Periodic Review
Of all of the international law mechanisms that have come into exis-
tence since world wars accelerated the international human rights move-
ment, the newest mechanism is the Universal Periodic Review, a
procedure established by the United Nations in 2006.415  The initial idea
behind the UPR was to subject the forty-seven States that compose the
Human Rights Council to extensive and regular reviews of their human
rights records to prove their worthiness to sit in judgment of the records
of other States.416  The UPR now entails reviewing the human rights re-
cord of each of the 192 U.N. Member States.  Although the UPR was first
established as a process by which the HRC was to review the human
rights compliance record of each U.N. member every two years,417 the
frequency was later changed to once every four years.418
In the early stages of the execution of this process, the reviews have
tended to last only a few hours and have not entailed the level of depth
envisioned when the process was initially established.419  These results
could be due to the diplomatic and political nature of the UPR, which by
412. Id.
413. Id. (describing the process implemented in an effort to remedy a human rights
violation).  This process can take more than one year to complete. Id. Despite the amount
of time required, this process has been effective in changing State behavior regarding viola-
tions of human rights. Id.
414. ABRAHAM, supra note 305.
415. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456 (describing the Universal Periodic
Review process); supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text.
416. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456 (providing the underlying motive be-
hind the creation of the Universal Periodic Review).
417. Id.
418. Universal Periodic Review, supra note 307.
419. O’CONNELL ET AL., supra note 272, at 456.
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definition could call into question its validity and its veracity.  On the
other hand, these early results could be viewed as a natural extension of
an undue suspicion of the parties involved.  The reviewing and reviewed
States are never all trusted allies.  Rarely would a Council Member State
want to be so open as to admit its shortcomings and be willing to follow
the advice of a group of nations, which also have significant shortcomings
in the human rights realm.  At this point in the world, no State can claim
to be a model of compliance to human rights obligations.
The recent Universal Periodic Review of the United States can be illu-
minating as to the prospects of this process in addressing and improving
the human rights record of the United States, both generally and specifi-
cally with regard to its criminal justice system.  As part of the UPR pro-
cess, the United States released its self-evaluation on August 23, 2010.420
The U.S. report stated, “[t]he United States has always been a multi-ra-
cial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious society. Although we have made great
strides, work remains to meet our goal of ensuring equality before the law
for all.”421  The United States then proceeded to congratulate itself for
having an African-American as President and as Attorney General, while
acknowledging that these developments “would not have seemed possi-
ble” thirty years earlier.422
Later in the report, to its credit, the United States remarked that,
“[t]he United States recognizes that racial or ethnic profiling is not effec-
tive law enforcement and is not consistent with our commitment to fair-
ness in our justice system.”423  In any remedial program regarding any
problem that might exist in human behavior and societal evolution, this
statement would amount to a necessary first step: an admission of the
problem, or, at least, an admission of part of the problem.  The United
States then went on to cite old laws enacted to prevent racial discrimina-
tion in various venues and forms, namely Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
420. Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, Human Rights Council, Na-
tional Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to Human
Rights Council Resolution 5/1, 9th Sess., Nov. 1-12, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/
1 (Aug. 23, 2010).
421. Id. at ¶ 29.
422. Id.
423. Id. at ¶ 50.  Racial profiling in the United States is particularly prevalent in traffic
stops, and has recently become more of an issue in the “country’s effort to combat terror-
ism.” Id. In recognition of these problematic areas, the United States has constructed
remedies to racial profiling. Id. at ¶¶ 51–54.  The United States appears to be addressing
racial profiling issues on various levels, which include: federal statutes and regulations
prohibiting racial discrimination, to governmental reviews regulating both national and in-
ternational obligations to eliminate racial discrimination. Id.
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of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 14141.424  However, all of the examples described
above illustrating how racial discrimination actually plays out within the
workings of the U.S. criminal justice system took place decades after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the statistics cited above
regarding disparity amongst the races of U.S. citizens in criminal convic-
tions also derive from studies completed within the past decade, indicat-
ing not that the United States has formally acknowledged the problem at
least since 1964, but also, equally as important if not more so, that signifi-
cant problems of disparate treatment of racial minorities under the law
still exist in the United States.
Perhaps some significance can be attached to the passage of 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141.  Passed in 1994, this statute makes it unlawful for any govern-
mental authority or law enforcement official to discriminate against indi-
viduals in the administration of juvenile justice.425  This statute further
provides the Attorney General with the right to “obtain appropriate eq-
uitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice” against
any such party deemed to be in violation of this statute.426  One compre-
hensive report by Carl Pope and Richard Feyerherm, covering over two
decades of the juvenile justice system, notes that if police decisions are
biased at the juvenile justice stage, this places minority youth at greater
risk of later discrimination, including higher retention of minorities in the
system.427  Thus, this new law appeared to address a timely issue when it
was passed.  However, while the statute is a step forward, the fact that it
stands alone, without accompanying law that addresses racial discrimina-
tion on a broader basis, means that it remains in part only an example of
what can be done domestically to eliminate racial discrimination on the
U.S. criminal justice system, and not an attempt to comprehensively solve
the overall problem.
The United States has recently taken one positive step to address an
area of potential racial discrimination, stating in its report to the United
424. Id. at ¶ 50. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2006)) (enacting provisions designed to prohibit
racial discrimination in any program receiving federal funding, with the purpose of enforc-
ing the Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (allowing the Attorney General to
attain equitable and declaratory relief in a civil action against law enforcement officers
who violate a juvenile individual’s Constitutional rights, specifically preventing acts of
discrimination).
425. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
426. Id.
427. MILLER, supra note 16, at 69–72. Miller points out that “prison populations [are]
likely to reach three to five million within the next decade,” and he predicts this will lead to
an emphasis on identifying the “predisposed” criminal. Id. at 234–35.  Miller implies that
this typology will rationalize, and lead to the majority of African-American men being
incarcerated. Id.
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Nations on August 3, 2010 that President Obama approved a law in-
tended to reduce “sentencing disparities between powder cocaine and
crack cocaine offenses, capping a long effort—one discussed at our UPR
consultations—that arose out of the fact that those convicted of crack
cocaine offenses are more likely to be members of a racial minority.”428
Whether or not this development took place directly and solely as a result
of the UPR process, it does seem to have happened as a result of dialogue
that has taken place between the United States as a State Party and other
State Parties or NGOs regarding that very issue in one or more forums,
including the UPR process.
The 2010 Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Pe-
riodic Review recorded scrutiny from many of the forty-seven Member
States’ on human rights in the United States,429 including China, which
expressed concern about “gaps in human rights legislation” and the
United States not yet becoming a “party to a number of core interna-
tional human rights instruments.”430  This very point by China, a country
not known for a stellar record of upholding its own human rights obliga-
tions, may be the most pertinent comment made by all States in the work-
ing group report, as the shortfall in ratifications of treaties noted earlier
has prevented the United States from being subject to many mechanisms
of enforcement of human rights law.
Of the eighty-three paragraphs of comments that comprise much of the
report of the working group, twenty-two referenced problems with racial
discrimination, fifteen of which were specifically related to the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system.431  Given the myriad other issues that were highlighted
by Member States, such as allegations of torture-use by the U.S. govern-
428. Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, supra note 420, at ¶ 50.  The
report indicates the United States’ recognition of civilian concern regarding the criminal
justice system and “racial disparities in sentencing,” but notes a commitment to upholding
the Constitution “in a manner consistent . . . with the rights and dignity of all citizens.” Id.
at ¶ 57.
429. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23 (recording India’s, Bangladesh’s, and the Republic of Korea’s
concerns with the U. S.s’ human rights policies internationally, and the treatment of for-
eign migrants in the United States).  Haiti and Bahrain focused their scrutiny on solutions
to human rights problems, specifically inquiring about the feasibility of the United States
establishing a national human rights institution. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 78.
430. Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, supra note 420.  As an example
of one of the gaps in legislation China finds most concerning, China referenced the U. S.
law enforcement agencies’ tendency to use excessive force. Id. at ¶ 21.  China also took
issue with the higher incidence of poverty among African-Americans, Latinos and Native
Americans. Id.
431. See id. (listing generally the main complaints and acknowledgements of each
country regarding human rights in the United States).  A significant number of countries
inquired about the United States’ continued use of the death penalty, many encouraging
the United States to declare an official moratorium on executions. Id. at ¶ 21.
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ment, and the fact that the United States is one of the few remaining
major powers to still invoke the death penalty in its justice system,432
issues regarding racial discrimination in the administration of justice were
most likely set aside by many member States in lieu of these other issues.
The Working Group report includes 228 recommendations, many of
which call for United States ratification, without reservations, of key in-
ternational treaties, and an end to racial discrimination in all its forms433
While the call for ratifications is specific, the racial discrimination recom-
mendations tend to take the form of Vietnam’s, which calls upon the
United States to, “make further efforts in order to eliminate all forms of
discrimination and the abuse of authority by police officers against mi-
grants and foreigners, especially the community of Vietnamese origin,”434
thus merely calling attention to the issue on behalf of its citizens without
stating what specific action is recommended for the purpose of solving
the problem.  The very fact that the United States has not ratified many
of the core human rights treaties, and has disregarded the advice of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with respect to the death
penalty invoked upon Garza in the case cited above, means that even the
specific recommendation on treaty ratification will go unheeded.  In re-
sponse to the recommendations, for example, the United States empha-
sized its condemnation of racial and ethnic profiling, its committed to
proper treatment of prisoners, and its maintenance of safe, humane
prison facilities, all in compliance with international and domestic law,435
as recommended by Bolivia in the Working Group report,436 pointing out
that its domestic laws are already consistent with the recommendations,
and that routine reviews of policies and procedures are conducted to en-
sure no racial profiling occurs.437  No reason exists to believe that the
United States will discontinue this type of response to the recommenda-
tions of the international community regarding human rights law issues in
general, and regarding racial discrimination in its criminal justice system
in particular.
432. Id.  A few countries credited the United States with improving its death penalty
policy, through methods such as excluding offenders under eighteen and those with intel-
lectual disabilities. Id. at ¶¶ 75, 77.
433. Id.  Each country’s recommendations focused on different treaties and organiza-
tions, however the general theme of the recommendations was Stated by Bolivia:
“[C]omply with the protection of the right to non-discrimination . . . .” Id. at ¶ 92.
434. Id. Vietnam also made recommendations speaking particularly to discrimination
against migrants, foreigners, and students, exemplifying a lack of international human
rights support on the part of the United States. Id. at ¶ 47.
435. Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, supra note 420.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION: WHAT ACTIONS CAN ADDRESS RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM?
The existence of racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice sys-
tem is not a premise that is agreed-upon by legal scholars.  Some have
argued that disparities in conviction rates and the severity of sentences
between minorities and the majority Caucasian population of the United
States are merely reflections of the disparity of the crime rates committed
by the various racial segments of U.S. society.  While others have argued
that the statistics, which show a disproportionate conviction rate of U.S.
citizens who are Caucasian versus racial minorities, are truly indicative of
a criminal justice system that discriminates against people based on their
race.438  Regardless of the meaning of those statistics, whether they tell of
a higher rate of crime committed by minorities, or instead are representa-
tive of enforcement of crime tainted by racial bias, a problem definitely
exists and has been noted on both sides of the debate.  Minorities have a
representation in the various stages of the U.S. criminal justice system
that is disproportionate to their relative populations.439
The examples of cases above are presented in an effort to show exactly
how racial discrimination can and has played a part in the manner in
which the U.S. criminal justice system is administered with regard to ra-
cial minorities in the United States.  Presenting solutions to the problems
illuminated by these examples, and to the problem of disproportionate
representation of minorities in the U.S. criminal justice system, has
proven to be a much more challenging task.  One argument for why such
solutions are so difficult to find is contained in the premise that to the
extent that racial discrimination continues to permeate all aspects of soci-
etal interaction in the United States, and for as long as this will be so,
racial discrimination will continue to exist to that extent in  the U.S. crim-
inal justice system.  The United States, in its March 10, 2011 response to
the Working Group report, stated that it may never realistically achieve
438. See Heather Mac Donald, supra note 1 (“The [B]lack incarceration rate is over-
whelmingly a function of [B]lack crime.”); see generally Miller, supra note 16 (exploring
statistics evidencing racial differences in the criminal justice system, with the rate of minor-
ity prisoners rising in the later stages of the system).
439. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, BREAKING THE CHAINS: COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, FROM CRISIS TO POWER: BREAKING THE CHAINS OF ADDIC-
TION 2 (2010), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/fact_sheet_health.pdf.
The report points out laws that directly impact certain minority groups, such as federally
recognized tribal lands subjecting Native American offenders to longer sentences under
the federal system, and higher penalties for crack cocaine versus powder resulting in more
African-American offenders serving longer prison sentences. Id.  Disproportionately,
Drug Policy Alliance reports African-Americans as comprising 13% of all drug users, yet
account for 35% of all offenders arrested for drug possession, 55% of all those convicted,
and 74% of all those incarcerated. Id.
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the “literal terms” it has been urged to strive for, remarking that the
United States intends to continue doing what it already does, without
supporting the recommendations that underState the success of ongoing
efforts.440  The burgeoning and evolving field of human rights law, as dis-
cussed at length above, will continue to provide pressure on the United
States to greatly improve its criminal justice system by continuing to pass
new laws that protect minorities from racial discrimination, and educate
its administrators such that prevailing attitudes evolve to the point of be-
ing bias-free.  The solution is in the hands of the U.S. government, and it
can be realized.
440. Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, supra note 420.  The United
States responded to some countries defensively, stating certain recommendations were in-
accurate and contrary to the spirit of the UPR. Id. at ¶ 4.  Responding with dismissal of
certain recommendations, the United States gave little credit to the “ideals” represented in
the commentary and highlighted the fact that the country has already implemented the
necessary efforts that were discussed in the UPR Working Group. Id. at ¶ 3.
